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The Litigation Rollercoaster of BIPA: A Comment
on the Protection of Individuals from Violations of
Biometric Information Privacy
Anna L. Metzger*
As technology progresses, businesses are enacting new programs that
utilize emerging technology. Biometric data is an example of a tech
capability that is becoming more popular for businesses. Companies can use
an individual’s unique body data to monitor their employees, collect data,
and enhance security and convenience for their customers. While this
technology is impressive, it comes with privacy and security concerns. In
2008, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) to
address these concerns. BIPA aims to protect individuals by setting strict
guidelines for data collection by private entities. Individuals can file suit for
violations of this statute, so long as they can show that they are an aggrieved
party.
Since June 1, 2017, over two hundred class actions have been filed in
Illinois alleging claims under BIPA. In 2017, Illinois’s Second District
Appellate Court heard an appeal from a ruling in Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Entertainment Corp. and set forth an important new interpretation of BIPA.
The appellate court found that the plaintiff was not an aggrieved party as
they did not assert actual harm from the violation of BIPA. In 2018, Illinois’s
First District Appellate Court disagreed with this holding, and in the case of
Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., held that a statutory violation of
BIPA created an aggrieved party. Also in 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court
agreed to hear the appeal of Rosenbach.
On January 25, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp. In a unanimous
decision, the court held a person is “aggrieved” when there is a technical
violation of BIPA; a showing of further harm is not necessary to bring a
cause of action under the statute. This Comment will examine the Rosenbach
decision and analyze its overall logic, application of Illinois’s statute and
case law, and appreciation for the intent of the Illinois legislature.
Last, this Comment will assess the impact of the Illinois Supreme Court’s
decision on the future of biometric data collection and provide suggestions
for future corporate compliance.
* JD Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2020.
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INTRODUCTION
As technology progresses, businesses are implementing new programs
that utilize emerging technology.1 Biometric data is an example of a
technological capability that is becoming increasingly popular for
1. See Adam Rogers, Innovation Case Studies: How Companies Use Technology to Solidify a
Competitive Advantage, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/2018/04/13/innovation-case-studies-how-companies-use-technology-tosolidify-a-competitive-advantage/#7ff2a0f51410 (“It’s become impossible to separate business
strategy from technological innovation, so everyone from retailers to health care professionals are
investing heavily in tech solutions to help them market, improve offerings and drive business.”);
see
also
Small
Business
Technology
Trends,
DELOITTE:
PERSP.
(2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/technology-media-and-telecommunications/articles/
connected-small-businesses.html (“Digital technology is driving many changes in consumer
behavior and the business environment. . . . The use of digital tools can help small businesse[s] to
improve their performance and respond to changes in the business and consumer landscape in an
agile manner.”).
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businesses.2 In Illinois, use of biometric data has revealed a unique
intersection between business priorities, technological advancements,
and the privacy rights of individuals.3 The legal community is currently
grappling with this balance of business interests and the protection of
individuals.4 This debate has manifested in the form of lawsuits brought
under an Illinois statute concerning biometric data: the Biometric
Information Privacy Act.5
Biometrics are physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, face, iris,
and voice that can be used for automated recognition of an individual.6
Technologies use these characteristics because they are unique to each
individual and do not change over time.7 Current technology allows
biometric data to be collected, analyzed, and saved; a user of biometric
technology enrolls into a system by providing her information, and this
information is stored and later used to recognize that user. 8 Government
agencies and businesses utilize this biometric information for a variety of
2. See Hannah Zimmerman, The Data of You: Regulating Private Industry’s Collection of
Biometric Information, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 637, 639 (2018) (“According to a market research
report by Application, Technology, Function, & Geography, ‘the biometrics market is expected to
reach $32.73 billion by 2022.’”); see also Niya T. McCray, Sensitive to the Touch: The Evolution
of U.S. Biometric Privacy Law, FOR DEF., May 2018, at 77, 77 (2018) (explaining that an increasing
amount of employers and businesses are using biometric data to streamline, prevent timekeeping
fraud, and to strengthen operational security).
3. See McCray, supra note 2, at 78 (noting that although biometrics are helpful to companies
and the use of biometric data is surging, there are “unanswerable questions” about the security of
biometrics that are driving legislation and litigation in Illinois).
4. See id.; see also Kwabena A. Appenteng & Philip L. Gordon, Recent Illinois Appellate Court
Ruling Could End the Recent Flood of Class Action Lawsuits Against Employers Under Illinois’
Biometric Information Privacy Act, LITTLER (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.littler.com/publicationpress/publication/recent-illinois-appellate-court-ruling-could-end-recent-flood-class (describing a
conflict between employers who use biometric data and their employees, who are debating privacy
rights under BIPA).
5. See Charles N. Insler, Understanding the Biometric Information Privacy Act Litigation
Explosion, ILL. B.J., Mar. 2018, at 34, 49 (“Recent months have seen an explosion in litigation
under BIPA. With technology constantly evolving and advancing, particularly in the field of
biometric information, BIPA will almost certainly be a topic of discussion and a source of litigation
for years to come . . . .”); see also, e.g., Ann H. MacDonald & Lauren S. Novak, Illinois Biometric
Lawsuits: An Early Roadmap for Biometric Litigation, SCHIFF HARDIN (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/publications/2018/illinois-biometric-lawsuits-an-earlyroadmap-for-biometric-litigation.
6. See
Biometrics,
U.S.
DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY
(Feb.
6,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics [hereinafter DHS Biometrics] (defining biometrics); see also
Dep’t of Comput. Sci. & Eng’g, Biometrics Research Grp., What Is Biometrics?, MICH. ST. U.,
http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/info/index.html (last visited June 16, 2019) [hereinafter What Is
Biometrics?] (describing anatomical and behavioral characteristics that biometric recognition
utilizes).
7. See, e.g., DHS Biometrics, supra note 6; What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6; see also BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millett eds., 2010) (explaining
that the primary purpose of a biometric system is to capture, store, and match biometric data).
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purposes, including security, authentication of employee timekeeping,
fraud prevention, and convenience.9 The use of biometric data also brings
challenges, including privacy and security concerns.10
In 2008, the Illinois legislature adopted the Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA) to regulate businesses’ collection of biometric
information.11 As stated in the statute, its goal is to protect the biometric
information of private individuals.12 BIPA provides standards for
businesses in collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention,
and destruction of biometric identifiers and information.13 The statute
does not prevent companies from using biometric data, but it does limit
the way in which businesses use the information.14 Under BIPA,
9. See McCray, supra note 2, at 77 (“An increasing number of vendors, employers, and
businesses—both large and small—are incorporating biometric data into their daily operations as
mechanisms to streamline their systems, to prevent timekeeping fraud, and to bolster the strength
and integrity of their operational security.”); What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6 (demonstrating the
use of biometrics in government and commercial settings by describing that biometric recognition
is “used by financial institutions to prevent fraud, by citizens to secure their mobile phones, and by
the Department of Homeland Security to enhance border security”); see also Dave Zielinksi, Use
of Biometric Data Grows, Though Not Without Legal Risks, SHRM: TECH. (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/technology/pages/biometric-technologiesgrow-.aspx (identifying companies’ use of biometric data as a way to authenticate employee
identity for timekeeping).
10. Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 656 (“This constant tracking and collection of information
poses a myriad of potential harms to consumers. Companies that collect and store aggregations of
consumer data are at risk for security breaches where personal information is accessed by
hackers.”); see also Chiara A. Sottile, As Biometric Scanning Use Grows, So Does Security Risk,
NBC NEWS: MACH (July 24, 2016, 6:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/mach/biometricscanning-use-grows-so-do-security-risks-ncna593161.
11. See Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act FAQs, JACKSON LEWIS (2017),
https://www.jacksonlewis.com/sites/default/files/docs/IllinoisBiometricsFAQs2017.pdf
[hereinafter BIPA FAQs] (discussing that Illinois was one of the first states to pass a law regulating
businesses’ use of biometric data); see also What Is BIPA? Biometric Information Privacy Act,
PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, https://prwlegal.com/practice-areas/biometric-informationprivacy-act/ (last visited June 16, 2019) [hereinafter What Is BIPA?] (discussing the adoption of
BIPA).
12. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2018) (describing the sensitive nature of an individual’s
biometric data and stating that the statute’s protection of such data will benefit public welfare,
security, and safety).
13. See BIPA FAQs, supra note 11 (describing that the key features of BIPA are informed
consent prior to collection, a limited right to disclosure, protection obligations and retention
guidelines, prevention of profiting from biometric data, a private right of action for individuals
harmed by BIPA violations, and statutory damages that can reach $1,000 for each negligent
violation and $5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation); Justin O. Kay, The Illinois
Biometric
Information
Privacy
Act,
ASS’N
CORP.
COUNS.
1–2
(2017),
https://m.acc.com/chapters/chic/
upload/Drinker-Biddle-2017-1-BIPA-Article-2.pdf (detailing the sections of BIPA); What Is
BIPA?, supra note 11 (describing statute elements).
14. See What is BIPA?, supra note 11 (describing the elements of compliance for businesses);
see also BIPA FAQs, supra note 11 (suggesting a comprehensive plan for businesses to comply
with BIPA).
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companies must give notice and collect consent from individuals,
companies cannot sell biometric data, and companies must develop
policy for reasonable care in retention and destruction of information.15
BIPA also creates a private right of action, so aggrieved individuals may
file suit against entities for violation of the statute.16
From 2008 until 2015, BIPA was a relatively unknown statute.17 In
2015, its anonymity ended when a wave of lawsuits were filed under
BIPA.18 In 2017, the number of lawsuits filed under BIPA exploded as
employees began suing their employers.19 As the body of law on BIPA
progressed, a new issue regarding an individual’s standing emerged.20
15. See Erin Marine, Biometric Privacy Laws: Illinois and the Fight Against Intrusive Tech,
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2018), https://news.law.fordham.edu/
jcfl/2018/03/20/biometric-privacy-laws-illinois-and-the-fight-against-intrusive-tech/ (“Under the
Act, companies must give notice when they are collecting, using or storing biometric information,
and must obtain written consent before collecting biometric data from any individual. . . . More
specifically, companies must develop and implement a written biometric data policy that details
guidelines for the retention and destruction of biometric data and adopt procedural safeguards to
ensure sensitive data isn’t leaked or stolen.”); see also Erica Gunderson, Biometric Data: Are We
Safer in Illinois, or Just Having Less Fun?, WTTW NEWS: SCI.-TECH. (Jan. 22, 2018, 5:07 PM),
https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2018/01/22/biometric-data-are-we-safer-illinois-or-just-havingless-fun (stating that BIPA “bars the sharing of the data with others except in very narrow
circumstances, and bars (without exception) the sale or profiting from the data”).
16. See A New Threat from an Old Source: Class Action Liability Under Illinois’ Biometric
Information Privacy Act, BAKER MCKENZIE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/
en/insight/publications/2017/10/illinois-biometric-information-privacy-act [hereinafter A New
Threat from an Old Source] (stating that individuals can file suit under BIPA for statutory violations
related to the collection, retention, storage, and use of biometric identifiers and information); see
also Gunderson, supra note 15 (explaining that “BIPA permits individuals to sue in court for
violations of BIPA in certain circumstances”).
17. See Insler, supra note 5, at 35 (“In December 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois noted that it was ‘unaware of any judicial interpretation of the statute.’” (quoting
Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015))).
18. See Mimi Moore et al., Biometric Privacy Targeted in Increased Class Action Litigation in
Illinois, BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.bryancave.com/
en/thought-leadership/biometric-privacy-targeted-in-increased-class-action-litigation.html (“The
BIPA, however, was largely ignored until mid-2015 when the first wave of BIPA litigation was
filed against social media and photo-storage/sharing services.”); see also Carley Daye Andrews et
al., Litigation Under Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act Highlights Biometric Data Risks,
K&L GATES (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/litigation-under-illinois-biometricinformation-privacy-act-highlights-biometric-data-risks-11-07-2017 (“Despite years of inactivity
under Illinois BIPA, seven cases were filed in 2015; plaintiffs then filed seven more putative class
actions in 2016.”).
19. See Jay Hux, Collecting Employee Biometric Data Could Prove Costly in Illinois, SHRM:
ST. & LOC. UPDATES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-andcompliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/collecting-employee-biometric-data-could-provecostly-in-illinois.aspx (“The increased use of biometric data has led to a series of class-action
lawsuits in Illinois alleging employer violations of the BIPA.”); see also A New Threat from An
Old Source, supra note 16 (explaining that from July 2017 to October 2017, there were more than
twenty-five BIPA cases filed in the state and federal courts in Illinois).
20. See Jeffrey Neuburger, Litigants Alleging Procedural Violations of Illinois Biometric
Privacy Statute (BIPA) Are Not “Aggrieved” Parties That May Seek Legal Remedies, PROSKAUER
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Three notable cases in Illinois were decided, the central holdings of which
defined what it meant for an individual to have standing under BIPA.21
These decisions defined the meaning of an “aggrieved party” as used in
the BIPA statute.22 In McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc.23 and Rosenbach
v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.,24 the courts found that an individual is
not an aggrieved party if she alleges a technical violation without
showing actual harm or injury.25 However, the Illinois Appellate Court
in Sekura v. Krishna Schaumberg Tan, Inc.26 found otherwise, and held
that a technical violation of BIPA could cause a party to be aggrieved. 27
As a result, uncertainty and a need for clarification existed on this issue.28
ROSE LLP: NEW MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2018), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/
2018/01/02/litigants-alleging-procedural-violations-of-illinois-biometric-privacy-statute-bipa-arenot-aggrieved-parties-that-may-seek-legal-remedies/. In 2017,
it was not clear if mere procedural violations of BIPA’s consent and data retention
requirements, without any showing of actual harm or data misuse, were actionable under
the statute (i.e., whether persons pleading procedural violations are ‘aggrieved’ under
the statute, as BIPA expressly provides that ‘any person aggrieved by a violation’ of the
BIPA may pursue money damages and injunctive relief against the offending party).
Id.
21. See Insler, supra note 5, at 49 (identifying McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C
03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016), Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL
App (2d) 170317, rev’d, 2019 IL 123186, and Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL
App (1st) 180175).
22. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2018) (“Right of action. Any person aggrieved by a
violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim
in federal district court against an offending party.”); see also, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37
(providing background on decisions made in Illinois regarding “aggrieved party” language).
23. 2016 WL 4077108.
24. 2017 IL App (2d) 170317.
25. See Insler, supra note 5, at 49 (“Reviewing McCollough, Black’s Law Dictionary, and other
authorities, the second district held that if ‘a person alleges only a technical violation of the Act
without alleging any injury or adverse effect, then he or she is not aggrieved and may not
recover . . . .’” (quoting Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 28)); see also Andrew Goldstein,
Collecting Fingerprints or Other Biometric Information Without Consent Could Be Costly,
FREEBORN (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.incubateillinois.com/2017/10/collecting-fingerprintsbiometric-information-without-consent-costly (“Smarte Carte argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the claims based on a mere procedural violation of the BIPA without the plaintiffs
suffering any actual damages. The court agreed and dismissed the case asking, ‘How can there be
an injury from the lack of advance consent to retain the fingerprint data beyond the rental period if
there is no allegation that the information was disclosed or at risk of disclosure?’” (quoting
McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3)).
26. 2018 IL App (1st) 180175.
27. See Insler, supra note 5, at 37, 49 (“[T]he Circuit Court of Cook County found Sekura was
‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the statute. The judge wrote that the term ‘aggrieved’ does not
require a plaintiff to plead ‘specific or actual damages’ and is to be given a broad reading to protect
‘anyone like the plaintiff [] whose personal information has allegedly been mishandled in violation
of BIPA’” (quoting Sekura v. Krishna Schaumberg Tan, Inc., No. 2016 CH 4945, 2017 WL
1181420, at *3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 2017))).
28. See Micha Nandaraj Gallo, Illinois Supreme Court to Decide Statutory Standing
Requirements Under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, COVINGTON (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/illinois-supreme-court-to-decide-statutory-standing-
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On January 25, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court provided clarity by
resolving the inter-district split on what it means to be an “aggrieved
party.” In a unanimous decision in Rosenbach v. Six Flags,29 the court
held a person is “aggrieved” when there is a technical violation of BIPA;
a showing of further harm is not necessary to bring a cause of action under
the statute.30
To reach its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the plain
meaning of BIPA’s language, analyzed the legislative intent of the
statute, compared BIPA to other Illinois statutes, and consulted analogous
Illinois cases.31 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision ultimately reflects
the purpose of BIPA: the protection of an individual’s rights to private
biometric information and the prevention of insecure technology use by
companies.32 Although some critics of the decision fear a boom in
litigation and damage to businesses, the benefits of the court’s
interpretation outweigh any potential negatives. In addition, this decision
correctly placed greater importance on data privacy and reflects a
growing trend of concern over privacy.
Part I will discuss the evolution of biometric technology and its
multiple uses by business.33 This section will also explore the benefits of
biometric data as well as concerns that have led to the enactment of
legislation regarding biometric data.34
Part II will analyze the significant regulation on biometric privacy
collection: BIPA.35 Part II will also introduce different forms of litigation
that occurred after the enactment of BIPA. 36 This section will also
requirements-under-the-illinois-biometric-information-privacy-act/ (observing that this decision
presented the Illinois Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve an inter-district split); see also
Thomas Quinn Ford, Illinois Supreme Court Holds No Showing of Actual Harm Needed to State
Claim Under Biometric Information Privacy Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/illinois-supreme-court-holds-no-showing-actual-harmneeded-to-state-claim-under (“The court’s decision in Rosenbach v. Six Flags [] Entertainment
Corp. settles a split among Illinois’ appellate courts, which centered on what a plaintiff needs to
plead to be considered ‘aggrieved’ under BIPA.”).
29. See generally Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186.
30. Id. ¶ 40; see also Monica R. Chmielewski et al., Biometric Privacy: Illinois Supreme Court
Decision Allows Claims to Proceed Without Showing of Actual Harm, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 4,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-privacy-illinois-supreme-court-decisionallows-claims-to-proceed-without (providing an overview of the Illinois Supreme Court’s
decision).
31. See infra Parts III.A–D.
32. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c), (g) (2018) (describing the sensitive nature of an
individual’s biometric data and stating that the statute’s protection of such data will benefit public
welfare, security, and safety).
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. See infra Parts I.A–B.
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Parts II.B(1)–(2).
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introduce the recent cases about BIPA’s “aggrieved party” language and
discuss the case law’s interpretation of this statute.37
Part III will analyze the holding in Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Entertainment Corp.38 This section observes the interpretative principles
the court used to reach its decision that a statutory violation creates an
“aggrieved” party.39 Part III also compares the Supreme Court’s
reasoning to the analysis used in lower court decisions.40
In Part IV, I suggest that BIPA should be construed as a statute that
protects the individual’s rights, and that the court’s interpretation was in
accordance with this view.41 This section also explores the impact that
this holding will have on future BIPA litigation and business and
technology advancement.42 In addition, this Part will observe the
changing landscape of privacy laws nationwide.43
I. BIPA’S BACKGROUND
Biometrics can be used to recognize individuals based on their
biological information. Businesses use biometric data for a multitude of
reasons, including security, convenience, and monitoring of employees.44
Although widely used, biometric systems also carry security risks and
privacy concerns.45 In response to these concerns, Illinois’s legislature
sought to protect the biometric data of its citizens by law.46
A. The Development of Biometric Data
Biometrics is the automated recognition of individuals based on their
unique behavioral and biological characteristics.47 The practice of
identifying individuals by their biological information is not a new one;
37. See infra Part II.B(3).
38. See infra Parts III.A–D.
39. See infra Parts III.A–D.
40. See infra Parts III.A–D.
41. See infra Part IV.D.
42. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
43. See infra Part IV.C.
44. See McCray, supra note 2, at 77; What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6.
45. See, e.g., Sottile, supra note 10 (discussing instances of biometric hacking where millions
of individuals have lost personal information to identity theft).
46. Jacob Radecki & Christopher Dean, Actual Injury Required to State a Claim Under Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act, MCDONALD HOPKINS: BUS. ADVOC. (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://mcdonaldhopkins.com/Insights/Blog/Litigation-Trends/2018/01/18/Actual-injuryrequired-to-state-a-claim-under-the-Illinois-Biometric-Information-Privacy-Act (“BIPA was
enacted in 2008 in response to concerns that consumers’ fingerprints and other biometric data were
being gathered, stored, and possibly sold by Illinois businesses.”).
47. BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8, at 1 (defining
the term “biometrics”). See also, e.g., DHS Biometrics, supra note 6 (providing a general definition
of “biometrics,” and using one’s fingerprints as an illustration).
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fingerprints have been used for identification purposes for over a
century.48 The more modern form of biometric identification emerged in
the 1960s, when the process of biometric identification became
automated due to the increased availability of computers.49 Today, fully
automated systems can identify an individual by recognizing
characteristics such as fingerprints, face, iris, voice, and behavioral
characteristics.50 A general biometric system performs two basic
operations: (1) it creates a reference database when it captures and stores
a new biometric sample and information on an individual, and (2) it
matches information when it captures a sample and compares it to
previously collected reference samples.51
The use of biometric data is widespread and growing, especially in the
context of businesses collecting consumer and employee data.52
48. See BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8, at 16
(noting that British geneticist Francis Galton, who made important contributions to fingerprinting
as a tool for identification of criminals, coined the term “biometry” in 1901); see also What Is
Biometrics?, supra note 6 (stating that biometric recognition techniques have been used in forensic
applications for over 100 years).
49. See BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8, at 16
(defining “automated” as the use of digital computers and explaining that automated fingerprint,
handwriting, and facial recognition systems emerged in the 1960s as digital computers became
more widespread and capable); see also What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6 (explaining that the first
scientific paper on automated fingerprint matching was published by Mitchell Trauring in 1963).
50. See What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6 (describing anatomical and behavioral characteristics
that biometric recognition utilizes); see, e.g., DHS Biometrics, supra note 6 (illustrating biometric
information using the example of an individual’s fingerprints).
51. See BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8, at 2
(describing components of a system as “capture,” where the sensor collects biometric data from the
subject to be recognized; the “reference database,” where previously enrolled subjects’ biometric
data are held; the “matcher,” which compares presented data to reference data in order to make a
recognition decision; and “action,” where the system recognition decision is revealed and actions
are undertaken based on that decision); What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6 (illustrating a diagram
on the biometric capture process); Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 641 (“The biometric information
in the database is compiled as measurements, which are used to create an algorithm or a ‘template’
of an individual’s specific biometric characteristic . . . . Once an individual’s characteristic is in a
database, it is compared to new records. Biometric authentication can then be used to either verify
an individual’s identity, or to identify an unknown person. If the new records match the database
record, then that individual’s identity is confirmed.” (footnotes omitted)).
52. See Sottile, supra note 10 (“By 2019, biometrics are expected to be a 25-billion-dollar
industry with more than 500 million biometric scanners in use around the world . . . .”); see also
Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 637 (“The number of phones with embedded fingerprint sensors is
projected to grow from 499 million in 2015 to 1.6 billion in 2020. By 2019, fifty percent of
smartphones are expected to integrate an embedded fingerprint sensor.” (footnote omitted)). See
April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along with Serious Security Concerns, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2016,
11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/biometrics-coming-along-serious-security-concerns
(“Since Apple introduced its incredibly usable biometric identification with Apple’s home button
fingerprint sensor in 2013, the appetite for biometrics has expanded rapidly. Now MasterCard
wants to use your heartbeat data to verify purchases. Google’s new Abicus Project plans to monitor
your speech patterns, as well as how you walk and type, to confirm that it’s really you on the other
end of the smartphone. Other apps are looking at the uniqueness of vascular patterns in the eyes or
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Businesses use biometric data for a variety of purposes including
security, monitoring of employees, and convenience.53 For purposes of
security and fraud prevention, biometric data can be helpful for
businesses and customers alike.54 Traditional means of identification
(such as passwords, driver’s licenses, and social security numbers) can
be forgotten, lost, or forged.55 Instead of less secure protection methods
like passwords, biometric data can be used to unlock mobile devices and
mobile banking applications, prove identification at ATMs, and approve
payment at retail point of sale systems.56 This identification is more
difficult to replicate and cannot be lost, because it is based on an
individual’s unique biological markers.57 Additionally, employers can
utilize biometric data to better monitor their employees and accurately
clock their hours.58 Companies are also beginning to incorporate
even a person’s specific gait to verify identities.”); see also Selena Larson, Beyond Passwords:
Companies Use Fingerprints and Digital Behavior to ID Employees, CNN: BUS. (Mar. 18, 2018,
3:53
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/18/technology/biometrics-workplace/index.html
(estimating that 90 percent of businesses will use biometric authentication by 2020).
53. See McCray, supra note 2, at 77; What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6; see also Zielinksi,
supra note 9 (identifying companies’ use of biometric data as a way to authenticate employee
identity for time-keeping).
54. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 639; see also McCray, supra note 2, at 77.
55. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 642 (“Traditional methods of identification include
passwords, personal identification numbers (PIN), driver’s licenses, passports, and, increasingly,
social security numbers. While these methods have been used for years, they have unavoidable
disadvantages.” (footnote omitted)).
56. See Larson, supra note 52 (noting that “[c]ompanies such as Microsoft (MSFT) and
Facebook (FB) are trying to get rid of passwords completely,” Microsoft has new software which
“uses face scans or fingerprints to log in to Windows devices,” that “[m]ore than 50 million people
use Windows Hello to log in to their PCs,” and Apple introduced the iPhone X, which uses facial
recognition
unlocking
technology);
see
also
Biometric
ATM,
BIOENABLE,
https://www.bioenabletech.com/biometrics-atm (last visited June 16, 2019) (describing biometric
enabled ATMs); Justin Lee, Juniper Research Projects Nearly 5 Billion Biometric Transactions by
2019, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201510/
juniper-research-projects-nearly-5-billion-biometric-transactions-by-2019 (citing reports that the
increased use of touchless payment services such as Apple Pay and Samsung Pay that use
fingerprint readers will increase the number of biometric authenticated transactions to nearly 5
billion by 2019).
57. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 642 (“[B]iometric identification is difficult to duplicate,
cannot be lost, and does not depend on an individual to remember it because it is based on his or
her ‘intrinsic characteristics.’ Biometric characteristics are inherent and provide completely unique
data sets that result in accurate data generation and verification. It is, in fact, these intrinsic
characteristics that appeal so strongly to innovators.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Tiffany Lee,
Biometrics and Disability Rights: Legal Compliance in Biometric Identification Programs, 2016
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 209, 211 (“Biometric data has some advantages over the traditional
methods of determining identity. Unlike passwords or identification cards, ‘biometric identifiers
cannot be shared or misplaced, and they intrinsically represent the individual’s bodily identity.’”).
58. See Hux, supra note 19 (explaining that companies use biometric devices as a more secure
way to authenticate employee identity for time-keeping, to grant access to sensitive data, or to
facilitate onboarding and offboarding. Companies use biometric systems to ensure that workers
using a time clock are who they say they are and to avoid “buddy punching.” Biometric time clocks
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biometrics to add convenience and speed to their business practices in
areas like security lines, restaurant food service, and age and identity
certification.59
The increased use of biometrics demonstrates that the technology has
real benefits for businesses and consumers.60 However, while biometric
technology can deliver convenience, experts acknowledge that the
technology presents serious privacy and security concerns.61 The
technology is not perfectly secure, and there is always a possibility that
the information can be hacked.62 Companies who collect and store data
are at risk for security breaches, and large cyber security breaches have
that use fingerprint scanning or facial recognition can also help HR better comply with labor laws
by ensuring employees clock in and out accurately.); see also J. Wilson & C.R. Wright, Using
Biometrics in the Workplace, FISHER PHILLIPS (Jan. 6, 2014), https://www.fisherphillips.com/
resources-newsletters-article-using-biometrics-in-the-workplace (describing that businesses utilize
biometric data to prevent “buddy punching” to ensure that they are paying employees for actual
time worked and to increase security).
59. See CLEAR Partners with Seattle Seahawks, Sounders & Mariners to Launch IndustryLeading Biometric Payments & ID Check for Fast, Frictionless Concessions, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 6,
2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180806005577/en/CLEARPartners-Seattle-Seahawks-Sounders-Mariners-Launch (announcing Seattle major sports teams’
use of biometric information for age and identification verification in alcohol and concession
purchases); You’re the Perfect Person to Verify Your Identity, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.com/
how-it-works (last visited June 16, 2019) (describing the company Clear, which hosts biometric
machines in airports and large venues to reduce security lines); see also Malibu Poke Is Banking
on Facial Recognition Payments, PYMNTS.COM: RESTECH (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.pymnts.com/restaurant-technology/2017/malibu-poke-facial-recognition-biometricspayments/ (describing the use of biometrics in self-serve restaurant kiosks).
60. See Sottile, supra note 10 (“With biometrics, there’s no need to memorize an unwieldy
sequence of numbers and letters as with passwords—and consumers value that convenience. In a
OnePoll/Gigya survey, 80 percent of consumers who expressed a preference said they think
biometric authentication is more secure than traditional passwords, and 52 percent of consumers
said they would choose anything but a traditional password when given the choice.”); see also
Gunderson, supra note 15 (stating that biometric data delivers convenience and security to
consumers).
61. See Robee Krishan & Reza Mostafavi, Biometric Technology: Security and Privacy
Concerns, 22 J. INTERNET L. 19, 19 (2018) (“The concerns come in the form of both security and
privacy. For instance, in the event of a data breach or hack, biometric data cannot be reissued,
unlike the way passwords can be quickly changed following being compromised. Thus, the
applications that make use of the biometrics will become defunct, until a new authentication method
can be secured. This represents a material security flaw, but moreover there are also material
privacy concerns. For example, biometric data contain information about individuals such as
proclivity to certain diseases that could be used to discriminate in the form [of] insurance denial.”);
see, e.g., Sottile, supra note 10 (discussing instances of widespread security breaches where
sensitive biometric information was stolen).
62. See Glaser, supra note 52 (describing hacking events such as the 2015 hack of the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management where 5.6 million people’s fingerprints were compromised and
referencing the findings of researchers and security firms in the penetrability of biometric security);
see also Olivia Solon, The End of Passwords: Biometrics Are Coming but Do Risks Outweigh
Benefits?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/dec/08/the-end-of-passwords-biometrics-risks-benefits (describing the “tantalising” nature of
personal data as evidenced by the 2015 OPM attack).
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become increasingly common.63 A biometric breach is especially
problematic because, unlike passwords or social security numbers,
biometric information cannot be erased or changed when personal
information is compromised.64 Additionally, some privacy advocates
argue that biometric data deserves a higher level of protection than other
personal information as it is so intimately tied to an individual.65
B. Adoption of the 2008 Biometric Information Privacy Act
BIPA was passed in 2008 in response to growing concerns regarding
the security of consumers’ biometric information.66 Some of the concerns
about the collection of biometrics stemmed from the collapse of a

63. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 656–57 (“As technology continues to evolve, a trend of
increased cyber security breaches has emerged. . . . [R]ecently, the Philippines’ Commission on
Elections was subject to hackers who accessed a database of 55 million voters in the Philippines.
Described as the largest government-related data breach in history, the leaked information included
‘228,605 email addresses; 1.3 million passport numbers and expiry dates of overseas Filipino
voters; and 15.8 million fingerprint records.’” (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., Glaser, supra note 52
(noting personal data seized by the 2015 OPM attack); see also Paul J. Lim, Equifax’s Massive
Data Breach Has Cost the Company $4 Billion So Far, MONEY (Sept. 12, 2017),
http://money.com/money/4936732/equifaxs-massive-data-breach-has-cost-the-company-4billion-so-far/ (detailing the blow that Equifax suffered in the market due to a lack of trust in the
company. Equifax’s direct costs tied to dealing with this crisis were estimated between $200 million
and $300 million.); Kevin McCoy, Target to Pay $18.5M for 2013 Data Breach That Affected 41
Million Consumers, USA TODAY (May 23, 2017, 4:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/2017/05/23/target-pay-185m-2013-data-breach-affected-consumers/102063932/
(explaining that Target is on the hook to pay an $18.5 million multistate settlement for the 2013
cyber-attack that compromised customer payment card accounts).
64. See Sottile, supra note 10 (quoting former Interpol and FBI member Marc Goodman, “You
can always get a new credit card. You can always create a new password. [It’s] really hard to get
new fingers. You only have ten of them and once that information leaks, it’s out and there’s nothing
you can do”); see also Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 658 (“Stolen biometric information poses
unique problems for consumers. A victim of identity theft can get a new credit card, change their
passwords and pin numbers, or even change their Social Security number. A victim of identity theft
whose fingerprint data is stolen cannot change their fingerprints or get new ones. Biometric
information is permanently associated with a user and once stolen, it is out of the user’s control
forever.” (footnotes omitted)).
65. See Natasha Singer, When a Palm Reader Knows More Than Your Life Line, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/technology/biometric-data-gathering-setsoff-a-privacy-debate.html (quoting advocates who suggest that biometric information should be
handled as if it was a genetic sample); see also What Facial Recognition Technology Means for
Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech., & the Law of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of Al Franken, U.S. Sen.) (“I believe that
we have a fundamental right to control our private information, and biometric information is
already among the most sensitive of our private information, mainly because it is both unique and
permanent.”).
66. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(d) (2018) (“An overwhelming majority of members of the public
are weary of the use of biometrics when such information is tied to finances and other personal
information.”); see Radecki & Dean, supra note 46 (“BIPA was enacted in 2008 in response to
concerns that consumers’ fingerprints and other biometric data were being gathered, stored, and
possibly sold by Illinois businesses.”).
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company called Pay By Touch.67 This company permitted consumers to
link their bank accounts to their fingerprints, but it went out of business
in early 2008.68 The company’s bankruptcy caused legislators to ask
questions about the biometric information Pay By Touch collected and
stored, because in its bankruptcy proceedings, the company sold its
database that contained fingerprint data of thousands of Illinois residents
without informing users how the data would be used.69
BIPA was introduced to the Illinois Senate in February 2008, and
Representative Kathleen Ryg, BIPA’s House sponsor, referred to the Pay
By Touch incident as demonstrative of the necessity of protecting
individuals’ biometric data.70 The fact that the company’s users were
unaware that their data was being sold and were provided no guarantee
of security or protection helped the Illinois legislature realize that the
state was in “very serious need of protections for the citizens of Illinois
when it comes to biometric information.”71 In the hearing, there were no
questions or discussion, and the bill proceeded immediately to a vote and
unanimously passed in the House.72
BIPA’s stated purpose also reflects an intent to safeguard and monitor
individuals’ data.73 The statute first recognizes the personal nature of
67. See Gunderson, supra note 15 (discussing that the fall of Pay By Touch concerned
customers that had provided their data to the company, but did not know what would become of
their information); see also Insler, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that before its collapse, Pay By Touch
operated the largest fingerprint scan system in Illinois and that a number of grocery stores, gas
stations, and school cafeterias participated in its pilot program).
68. See Kay, supra note 13, at 1 (“Investors poured $340 million into the venture, and millions
of consumers signed up. By late 2007, however, Pay By Touch and one of its founders—John
Rogers—were mired in controversy and litigation (including bankruptcy), and in March 2008, Pay
By Touch ceased all operations.”); see, e.g., Insler, supra note 5 (recounting the demise of Pay By
Touch, which ultimately prompted the Illinois Legislature to enact BIPA).
69. See Insler, supra note 5, at 35 (“Pay By Touch’s bankruptcy left thousands of individuals
wondering what would become of their fingerprints, a form of biometric data . . . .”); see, e.g., Kay,
supra note 13, at 1 n.1 (quoting Illinois House Representative Joseph M. Lyons mentioning the
pending uncertainty of former Pay By Touch customers as a motivating factor for the passage of
BIPA).
70. See H.R. Debate Transcript, 95th Gen. Assemb. No. 276, at 249 (Ill. 2008) (statement of
Rep. Kathy Ryg) (“This Bill is especially important because one of the companies that has been
piloted in Illinois, Pay By Touch, is the largest fingerprint scan system in Illinois and they have
recently filed for bankruptcy and wholly stopped providing verification services in March of 2008.
This pullout leaves thousands of customers from Albertson’s, Cub Foods, Farm Fresh, Jewel Osco,
Shell, and Sunflower Market wondering what will become of their biometric and financial data.”).
71. Id. (Statement of Rep. Joseph M. Lyons); see Kay, supra note 13, at 1 (“Pay By Touch’s
rise and fall was the catalyst for first state law governing the collection, use, safeguarding, and
storage of biometric information . . . .”).
72. Id. at 250 (statement of Rep. Joseph M. Lyons) (“On this Bill, there are 113 Members voting
‘yes’, 0 voting ‘no’. This Bill, having received the Constitutional Majority, is hereby declared
passed.”).
73. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2018); see also Marine, supra note 15 (stating that that
biometric privacy laws principally address corporations storing large swaths of the highly personal

1064

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

biometric data by stating, “Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers
that are used to access finances or other sensitive information. For
example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed.
Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore,
once compromised, the individual has no recourse . . . .”74 The statute
also expresses concern over the lack of security and oversight of such
information, and concludes that “[t]he public welfare, security, and safety
will be served by regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, handling,
storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and
information.”75
II. THE BIPA LITIGATION ROLLERCOASTER
BIPA was enacted in 2008 and has five notable provisions. 76 Illinois
is one of only three states that has a statute protecting biometric data but
BIPA is the only statute that provides a private cause of action.77 In 2015,
Illinois experienced an uptick of litigation under BIPA, and parties began
bringing large class action suits against internet companies and
employers.78 For several years, the lower courts attempted to define what
an “aggrieved party” meant and who had standing under BIPA, which
resulted in an inter-district split, requiring the Illinois Supreme Court’s
intervention.79
A. Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act
Broadly stated, BIPA has five key features: (1) informed consent prior
to collection; (2) a limited right to disclosure and prohibition of profiting
from biometric data; (3) safeguarding regulations; (4) retention and
destruction guidelines; and (5) a private right of action for individuals
harmed by a BIPA violation with statutory damages that can reach $1,000
for each negligent violation, and $5,000 for each intentional or reckless
biometric data of consumers).
74. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c).
75. Id. 14/5(g).
76. Id. 14; see, e.g., BIPA FAQs, supra note 11 (outlining the practical effects of BIPA with
regard to application for Illinois businesses and organizations); Insler, supra note 5, at 36
(discussing the origins and key provisions of BIPA).
77. See Andrews et al., supra note 18 (noting that BIPA has received more attention from
plaintiffs compared to Texas or Washington’s statutes, because BIPA has a private right of action
while the Texas and Washington statutes do not); see also Insler, supra note 5, at 36 (highlighting
that Illinois is the only state with a private cause of action for a biometric statute).
78. See, e.g., Andrews et al., supra note 18 (tracking the recent increase in both individual and
class action suits claiming violations of BIPA).
79. See, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing the inter-district disagreement as to what
constitutes an “aggrieved” person under BIPA, which encouraged the Illinois Supreme Court to
provide guidance).
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violation.80
First, relating to informed consent, BIPA prohibits any private entity
from collecting, capturing, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining a person’s
biometric identifiers or information without first informing the individual
or individual’s authorized representative in writing that it is collecting
data.81 BIPA specifically defines biometric identifiers as “a retina or iris
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”82 The
entity must provide the specific purpose and length of term for which a
biometric identifier or information is being collected, stored, and used.83
Then, the private entity must also obtain a written release from the person
in order to collect.84
Second, regarding sale and dissemination, BIPA prohibits any private
entity from (1) selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from a
biometric identifier or information; and (2) otherwise disclosing or
disseminating such information unless the person consents, the disclosure
completes a financial transaction authorized by the person, or the
disclosure is required by law or requested via warrant or subpoena.85
Third, to ensure effective data safeguarding, BIPA requires any private
80. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2018); see, e.g., BIPA FAQs, supra note 11 (discussing the five
key elements of BIPA, including the monetary penalties for each violation of the statute); see Insler
supra note 5, at 36 (discussing the five key features of BIPA).
81. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b); see, e.g., Kay, supra note 13, at 2 (highlighting the informed
consent requirement of BIPA, along with what pieces of information must be included in the written
consent form).
82. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10.
This statute notes that biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written
signatures, photographs, human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or
screening, demographic data, tattoo descriptions or physical descriptions such as height,
weight, hair color, or eye color . . . donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the
Illinois Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential
recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by a federally
designated organ procurement agency . . . materials regulated under the Genetic
Information Privacy Act . . . information captured from a patient in a health care setting
or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations
under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 . . . an Xray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan, mammography, or other
image or film of the human anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or
other medical condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening.
Id.
83. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(2); see, e.g., Kay, supra note 13, at 2 (detailing the consent
form requirements that businesses and organizations must provide in order to comply with BIPA).
84. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(3); see, e.g., Kay, supra note 13, at 2 (noting BIPA’s writing
requirement that businesses and organizations must abide by in order to collect an individual’s
biometric information).
85. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c)–(d); see, e.g., Kay, supra note 13, at 2 (analyzing the strict
prohibition against disseminating an individual’s biometric information without their informed
consent).
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entity in possession of biometric identifiers or information to “store,
transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric identifiers and
biometric information using the reasonable standard of care within the
private entity’s industry,” and it must store the information in “the same
as or more protective than the manner in which the private entity stores,
transmits, and protects other confidential and sensitive information.”86
Fourth, in retention and destruction, the private entity in possession of
biometric identifiers or information must develop and adhere to
a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric
identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for
collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied
or within 3 years of the individual’s last interaction with the private
entity, whichever occurs first.87

Lastly, BIPA creates a private right of action for “[a]ny person
aggrieved by a violation of this Act” and entitles the prevailing party to
recover $1,000 or actual damages (whichever is greater) for each
negligent violation; $5,000 or actual damages (whichever is greater) for
each intentional or reckless violation; reasonable attorneys’ fees,
litigation expenses, and costs (including expert witness fees); and “other
relief, including an injunction” for each violation.88
Illinois was the first state to enact such a biometric protection statute
and is unique compared to the other states that subsequently adopted
biometric laws.89 It is one of three states that have adopted an official
policy on biometric privacy protection, with Texas and Washington being
the other two states with biometric regulations statutes.90 However,
BIPA, unlike Washington’s and Texas’s statutes, allows for a private
right of action.91 In both Washington and Texas, there is no private right
86. Kay, supra note 13, at 2 (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)).
87. Id. (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a)).
88. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20.
89. See Becky Yerak, Mariano’s, Kimpton Hotels Sued over Alleged Collection of Biometric
Data: ‘It’s Something Very Personal’, CHI. TRIB. (July 21, 2017, 1:35 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-employers-biometrics-lawsuits-0723-biz-20170720story.html (describing Illinois as the first state to place restrictions on businesses’ collection,
storage, and use of biometric data and discussing that BIPA is considered the nation’s toughest
biometrics privacy law); see, e.g., Marine, supra note 15 (“While two other states, Texas and
Washington, have also implemented biometric privacy acts, BIPA remains the touchstone for
biometric data regulation largely because of the significant penalties it imposes for
noncompliance.”).
90. See Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois Cousin,
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/ECA8-39HJ (explaining that Washington’s
2007 biometric privacy law has significant compliance obligations but lacks a right for consumers
to sue and that the 2009 Texas law doesn’t include a provision to allow consumers to sue).
91. See Andrews et al., supra note 18 (noting that BIPA has received more attention from
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of action, and enforcement of their respective biometric statutes is left to
the state attorney general.92 In addition, although biometric protection has
been discussed at the federal level, no federal statute on biometric
protection has been passed.93
Since BIPA’s enactment, some have condemned the statute as
deterrent to technological innovation, while others have criticized it for
encouraging a wave of class actions.94 In February 2018, Illinois Senator
Bill Cunningham introduced a bill to amend BIPA. 95 The proposed bill
responded to concerns about businesses’ limited use of biometric data by
allowing companies to collect employees’ biometric information so long
as the information is used exclusively for employment, human resources,
identification, safety, security, or fraud prevention purposes. 96 This bill
stalled in the Illinois Senate, and was instead delayed and re-referred in
plaintiffs than Texas or Washington’s statutes because it has a private right of action while Texas
and Washington statutes do not); see also Insler, supra note 5, at 36 (highlighting that Illinois is the
only state with a private cause of action for a biometric statute).
92. See, e.g., Andrews et al., supra note 18 (discussing the similarities and differences between
Washington, Texas, and Illinois’s respective statutes); Shukovsky, supra note 90 (highlighting the
different characterizations of a private right of action allowance).
93. See What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech., & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
3 (2012) (statement of Al Franken, U.S. Sen.) (“I called this hearing to raise awareness about the
fact that facial recognition already exists right here, today, and we need to think about what that
means for our society. I also called this hearing to call attention to the fact that our Federal privacy
laws are almost totally unprepared to deal with this technology.”); Zimmerman, supra note 2, at
243 (“Though the United States is a world leader in data-driven business, current federal statutes
do not comprehensively regulate the collection of personal data via the Internet. Nor do they protect
consumers from the collection of biometric data. There is no generally applicable federal law
regulating the private industry’s collection, storage, use, purchasing and selling of biometric
information. Instead, federal privacy law in the United States is a patchwork of statutes that do not
sufficiently protect individuals’ biometric information privacy or give businesses a uniform law to
follow.” (footnote omitted)).
94. See Jeffrey Neuburger, Illinois Considering Amendments to Biometric Privacy Law (BIPA)
That Would Create Major Exemptions to Its Scope, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA & TECH.
L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2018), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/04/17/illinois-consideringamendments-to-biometric-privacy-law-bipa-that-would-create-major-exemptions-to-its-scope/
(“Privacy advocates have hailed BIPA’s strong biometric privacy protections, while some in the
tech and business community have decried that BIPA is deterring innovations in mobile services
and spurring a wave of copycat litigation against companies that collect biometric data to
authenticate customers or employees.”); see also Ally Marotti, Proposed Changes to Illinois’
Biometric Law Concern Privacy Advocates, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:55 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-illinois-biometrics-bills-20180409-story.html
(quoting a critic of BIPA that stated “[e]mployers are being sued for minor technicalities of the
law” and “[l]aws like the one currently in place also can add hoops for companies to jump through
and inhibit investment in the state . . . when companies ‘are looking to expand here, these sorts of
laws are on their corporate white papers.’”).
95. See S.B. 3053, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2018); see, e.g., Marotti, supra note 94 (reviewing
some of the drawbacks of BIPA in its current form).
96. See Ill. S.B. 3053; see, e.g., Marotti, supra note 94 (analyzing the claim that businesses are
being sued for very minor violations).
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April 2018.97
B. Recent Uptick in Litigation under BIPA
1. Large Class Action Lawsuits Against Internet Companies
From 2008 to 2015, BIPA was largely unknown to the legal
community and rarely litigated.98 This relative anonymity changed in
2015, however, when a series of cases against large social media and
internet companies were brought under the statute.99 These cases are
significant because they demonstrated that BIPA could hold companies
domiciled outside of the state accountable for information collected in
Illinois. Additionally, the media coverage and notoriety these cases
received drew more attention to BIPA.100 Norberg v. Shutterfly101 and
Rivera v. Google102 are two notable suits in this category. 103 Both cases
involved class BIPA claims and were filed against large social media
companies concerning facial recognition software.104 In Norberg, the
plaintiff filed suit on behalf of a class of people whose photographs and
identifying information Shutterfly uploaded and stored without obtaining
consent.105 The U.S. district judge found that Norberg had successfully
97. See Ill. S.B. 3053.
98. See Insler, supra note 5, at 35 (“In December 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois noted that it was ‘unaware of any judicial interpretation of the statute.’” (citing
Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015))); see also Moore et al.,
supra note 18 (stating that BIPA was largely ignored until mid-2015 when the first wave of BIPA
litigation was filed against social media and photo-storage/sharing services).
99. See Andrews et al., supra note 18 (“Despite years of inactivity under Illinois BIPA, seven
cases were filed in 2015; plaintiffs then filed seven more putative class actions in 2016.”); see also
Moore et al., supra note 18.
100. See Facing Privacy Suits About Facial Recognition: BIPA Cases Move Forward as More
States Consider Passing Biometric Data Laws, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIVACY & INFO.
SECURITY L. BLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/10/04/facingprivacy-suits-about-facial-recognition-bipa-cases-move-forward-as-more-states-consider-passingbiometric-data-laws/ [hereinafter Facing Privacy Suits] (explaining that although in-store use of
biometric-capture technology would currently pose a threat of consumer litigation only within
Illinois, the Norberg and Rivera cases indicate that retailers can be sued for capturing or storing the
biometric information of individuals accessing retailers’ websites from within the state of Illinois);
see, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (pointing out that large technology companies are not the only
entities targeted by biometric security lawsuits).
101. Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
102. Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
103. See, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing initial judicial decisions interpreting BIPA
including Norberg and Rivera); Kay, supra note 13, at 2.
104. See, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that the court was “unaware of any judicial
interpretation of the statute” (quoting Norberg, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1106)); Kay, supra note 13, at
2.
105. See Kim Janssen, Shutterfly Settles Facial Recognition Lawsuit With Man Who Claimed
Privacy Violation, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:57 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-facial-recognition-lawsuit-0413-biz-20160412-story.html (describing allegations that
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stated a claim under BIPA, and Shutterfly eventually settled.106 Similarly,
in Rivera, Google stored and scanned facial identifying information
without the plaintiff class’s consent.107 The court rejected Google’s
argument that the application of BIPA would give the statute
extraterritorial effect and violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and
found that any asserted violations must take place in Illinois to be
actionable.108
2. Labor and Employment Lawsuits under BIPA
Shortly following these cases, a new wave of BIPA class action
lawsuits were filed.109 Notable defendants in these cases included
Speedway, Inc., Roundy’s, which operates the Mariano’s grocery store
chain, InterContinental Hotels Group, and Zayo Group.110 Almost all the
Shutterfly “measured the contours of [Norberg’s] face and the distance between his eyes, nose and
ears to create a template it used to suggest other photos of Norberg be tagged with his name,” and
that it “attempted to determine Norberg’s race, age and location without trying to get his consent,
the suit alleged”).
106. See Kim Janssen, Facial Recognition Lawsuit Against Shutterfly Can Go Ahead, Judge
Rules, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2016, 8:56 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-shutterflylawsuit-0113-biz-20160112-story.html (explaining that “on December 29, 2015, U.S. District
Judge Charges Norgle” ruled against Shutterfly’s attempts to carry out the case and found that
Norberg had “plausibly stated a claim” under BIPA); see, e.g., Janssen supra note 105 (discussing
the underlying facts and ultimate settlement of the Norberg case).
107. Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 1091 (“Based on these allegations, Rivera and Weiss,
individually and on behalf of a proposed class, bring suit against Google for a violation of the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. They argue that the face geometry templates created
by Google are ‘biometric identifiers’ within the definition of the Privacy Act, and accordingly
cannot be collected without consent.”).
108. See, e.g., Facing Privacy Suits, supra note 100 (citing Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d. at 1088);
Jeffrey Neuburger, Court Refuses to Dismiss Biometric Privacy Action over Facial Recognition
Technology Used by Google Photos, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/03/02/court-refuses-to-dismiss-biometric-privacyaction-over-facial-recognition-technology-used-by-google-photos/ (citing Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d.
at 1088) (discussing cases interpreting the BIPA, including Rivera).
109. See Amy Korte, Illinois Employers Flooded With Class-Action Lawsuits Stemming from
Biometric Privacy Law, ILL. POL’Y (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinoisemployers-flooded-with-class-action-lawsuits-stemming-from-biometric-privacy-law/ (explaining
that between July and October 2017, employees filed twenty-six class action lawsuits against
employers); see also Cynthia J. Larose, The Law of Unintended Consequences: BIPA and the
Effects of the Illinois Class Action Epidemic on Employers, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/law-unintended-consequences-bipa-and-effects-illinoisclass-action-epidemic (“Between July and October, nearly 26 class-action lawsuits were filed in
Illinois state court by current and former employees alleging their employers had violated the BIPA.
Companies range from supermarket chains, a gas station and convenience store chain, a chain of
senior living facilities, several restaurant groups, and a chain of daycare facilities.”).
110. See, e.g., Korte, supra note 109 (listing Greencore USA-CPG Partners LLC, Superior AirGround Ambulance Service Inc., Millard Group LLC, Alliance Ground International LLC,
Pineapple Hospitality Company and Pineapple Restaurant Group LLC, and ABRA Auto Body &
Glass as additional employers that have been sued for alleged BIPA violations); Yerak, supra note
89 (discussing employers that “have been hauled into Cook County Circuit Court” in connection
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suits filed involved employer time-keeping methods that used fingerprint
or palm-print data to clock employees’ work hours.111 Plaintiffs alleged
an array of BIPA violations, including lack of notice and written consent,
and failure to inform about company policies for use, storage, and
destruction of biometric data.112 Most of these cases manifested as class
action lawsuits, and plaintiff groups sought recovery of high dollar
amounts.113 These cases demonstrated potential for large class action
recovery under BIPA, and the significant liability employers face if they
fail to comply with the statute.114
3. Cases Defining “Aggrieved Party”
Beginning in 2016, BIPA litigation entered a new and impactful phase
as defendants began to challenge the plaintiffs’ standing, arguing they
were not “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute because they did
not or could not allege an actual injury as a result of the defendant’s
violation of BIPA.115 The statute specifies that “[a]ny person aggrieved
with alleged violations of BIPA).
111. See Korte, supra note 109 (explaining that “these lawsuits are largely based on the use of
fingerprint-operated time clocks. The employee-plaintiffs have alleged their employers used those
time clocks to collect, use and store biologically derived, or biometric, information in a manner that
violates the consent, notice and disclosure requirements of the BIPA”); see also Larose, supra note
109 (“Facts vary from case to case, but nearly all of the recent employee BIPA cases implicate
fingerprint or palm-print time-keeping technologies that collect biometric data to clock employees’
work hours.”).
112. See Korte, supra note 109 (“The plaintiffs allege their employers failed to inform
employees about the companies’ policies for use, storage and ultimate destruction of the fingerprint
data or obtain the employees’ written consent before collecting, using or storing the biometric
information.”); see also Yerak, supra note 89 (describing the reaction of Kipton hotel worker Eric
Zepeda who joined in class action lawsuit: “‘It’s something very personal . . . . They were just
calling us to put our finger’ on a device. ‘It seemed normal afterwards, but I was still uncomfortable
and skeptical about it.’ He said he doesn’t know what Kimpton has done with his biometric data
and worries about what would happen to his and his former co-workers’ data if the company were
to be bought or file for bankruptcy.”).
113. See Hux, supra note 19 (stating that damages can be high because BIPA provides
employees with the right to collect the greater of $1,000 or actual damages for each negligent
violation, and the greater of $5,000 or actual damages for intentional or reckless violations); see
also Yerak, supra note 89 (explaining that damages sought from Roundy’s could exceed $7.5
million if 75 percent of its employees were to join the class action. If all workers became part of
the class, potential damages could be $10 million).
114. See Hux, supra note 19 (advising employers by stating, “For now, employers that obtain
or plan to obtain biometric data need to be aware of the BIPA’s requirements and take steps to
comply. These steps include providing employees with notice about biometric data collection and
developing written policies related to the collection, retention and destruction of biometric data.”).
115. See Private Rights of Action Under Illinois Biometric Privacy Statute Sharply Limited,
ROPES & GRAY: NEWSROOM (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/
2018/01/Private-Rights-of-Action-under-Illinois-Biometric-Privacy-Statute-Sharply-Limited
[hereinafter Private Rights of Action] (defining the impact of Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment
Corp. as “a powerful tool for defendants to obtain dismissal of BIPA claims. Companies may often
have arguments that their mere collection or other handling of biometric data caused no injury to
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by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action.”116 However, in
three cases, courts struggled to come to a consensus on what it means to
be an “aggrieved party” within the meaning of the statute.117 McCollough
v. Smarte Carte, Inc.,118 Sekura v. Krishna Schaumberg Tan, Inc.,119 and
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment120 were the three cases that
interpreted the meaning of “aggrieved party” prior to the Illinois Supreme
Court in 2019.121
In 2016, McCollough was decided in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.122 McCollough alleged that the
defendant, Smarte Carte, a company that operates fingerprint activated
lockers, retained her biometric information without notification and
without her written consent.123 Smarte Carte required that its customers
scan their fingerprints in order to rent and unlock lockers.124 It stored the
customers’ fingerprint data in order to recognize the customer for the
unlocking process.125 McCollough alleged that Smarte Carte failed to
plaintiff at all, requiring dismissal. Further, the ruling will likely make it harder for plaintiffs to
obtain class certification under BIPA.”); see, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing the
meaning of “aggrieved” within the statute).
116. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2018) (describing the right of action of aggrieved
persons).
117. See Goldstein, supra note 25 (“Courts have reached opposite results as to whether a
plaintiff must show damages in order to have standing to bring a claim under Illinois’ BIPA.”);
Private Rights of Action, supra note 115 (“[F]ederal district courts have reached conflicting
conclusions as to whether a plaintiff must plead and prove actual adverse consequences from the
alleged statutory violation in order to pursue his or her claims.”).
118. McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1,
2016).
119. Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180175.
120. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, rev’d, 2019 IL 123186.
121. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 25 (discussing “aggrieved party”); Insler, supra note 5, at
37 (discussing the term “aggrieved party” within the meaning of the statute).
122. McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108. See aso Josh Kantrow, Retaining Fingerprint
Information Does Not Necessarily Violate the Illinois Biometric Act, LEWIS BRISBOIS: ARTICLES
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://lewisbrisbois.com/newsroom/articles/retaining-fingerprint-informationdoes-not-necessarily-violate-the-illinois (indicating that the case was decided in 2016).
123. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 (explaining how the fingerprint is retained
without any form of consent); see also Kantrow, supra note 122 (explaining that Smart Carte
operates storage lockers that use the renter’s fingerprints as a key. Plaintiff McCollough claimed to
have used a Smart Carte locker at a train station five times in 2015).
124. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 (“In order to rent a Smarte Carte locker . . . the
customer is . . . instructed to place their finger on a fingerprint scanner, which is then displayed on
the screen; finally, the screen displays the locker number and unlocks the locker. The lockers
automatically lock when they are closed after the customer places their belongings inside.”); see,
e.g., Kantrow, supra note 122 (discussing how renter’s fingerprints are used as a key to operate
storage lockers in Chicago).
125. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 (“To retrieve their belongings, the customer
selects from the touchscreen the option to open their rented locker. The customer places their finger
on the scanner, which scans their fingerprint and displays it on the touchscreen. The matched
fingerprint causes the customer’s rented locker to unlock. The screen instructs the customer to
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obtain written consent to record, collect, obtain or store its customers’
fingerprints, did not inform its customers of the length of time it was
retaining their information, and did not disclose how it protects or
destroys biometric data.126 McCollough did not allege that Smarte Carte
illegally managed her information.127
Smarte Carte filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim, and the district court granted its motion. 128 First,
the court found that McCollough did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because she failed to allege an injury that would give her standing under
Article III of the Constitution.129 The court held that McCollough did not
have the requisite concrete harm to have standing under Article III
because she did not allege more than a procedural violation.130
Next, the court briefly addressed McCollough’s standing in Illinois

retrieve their belongings from the locker and the locker locks automatically when closed.”); see,
e.g., Kantrow, supra note 122 (describing how the storage locker operation retained fingerprints).
126. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 (“According to the Complaint, at no point does
Smarte Carte inform customers and obtain their written consent to record, collect, obtain, or store
their fingerprint. Smarte Carte also does not inform its customers of the length of time it retains the
information. The Complaint alleges that Smarte Carte does not publicly disclose its retention
schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and information. It also
alleges that Smarte Carte has not disclosed the purpose and length of time for which the biometric
identifiers and information is being collected, stored, and used.” (citing Plaintiff’s complaint)); see
also Kantrow, supra note 122 (describing plaintiff’s complaint, “She asserted that after retrieving
her items from the locker, Smart Carte retained her biometric information (fingerprints) without
notification and without her written consent.”); Amy Korte, Federal District Court in Illinois
Dismisses Biometric Information Privacy Case Against Smarte Carte, ILL. POL’Y (Aug. 19, 2016),
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/federal-district-court-in-illinois-dismisses-biometric-informationprivacy-case-against-smarte-carte/ (“The plaintiff in the Smarte Carte case alleged Smarte Carte
failed to obtain her consent to collect, store and use her fingerprint, and did not provide information
regarding the storage of her fingerprint.”).
127. See Kantrow, supra note 122 (discussing that plaintiffs will need to allege more than a
technical violation of BIPA, unlike the plaintiff in this case); see, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 25
(describing that the court dismissed the case due to the lack of allegation that the information was
disclosed or at risk of disclosure).
128. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 (“Plaintiff, Adina McCollough, filed a threecount Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and unjust enrichment stemming from violations
of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Smarte Carte,
Inc., now moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. . . . [T]his Court
grants the motion.”); see, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 25; Kantrow, supra note 122.
129. McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4 (holding that McCollough did not have standing
under Article III of the Constitution because she did not show an injury in fact that was concrete
and particularized).
130. Id. The court noted that “[e]ven without prior written consent to retain, if Smarte Carte did
indeed retain the fingerprint data beyond the rental period, this Court finds it difficult to imagine,
without more, how this retention could work a concrete harm.” Id. (citing Gubala v. Time Warner
Cable, Inc., No. 15-cv-1078, 2016 WL 3390415, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 17, 2016) (finding that the
plaintiff had not alleged a concrete injury as a result of the defendant retaining his personally
identifiable information even though it was a technical violation of the Cable Communications
Policy Act)).
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under BIPA.131 The court found that she was not an “aggrieved party”
because she did not allege a real injury or adverse effect from the use of
her fingerprints, even though Smarte Carte had committed a “technical
violation” of BIPA by failing to obtain advance notice and failing to
inform the McCollough of the company’s retention policy. 132 The court
found that a technical violation did not constitute an injury or adverse
effect and that an individual is not “aggrieved” under BIPA if they do not
experience more than a technical violation of BIPA.133
In 2017, the Cook County Circuit Court in Sekura v. Krishna
Schaumberg Tan, Inc. reached a different conclusion and found that a
mere technical violation of BIPA was sufficient to convey standing. 134
The defendant, Krishna Schaumberg Tan, Inc. (Krishna), filed a motion
to reconsider, and in January 2018 the court reversed its 2017 decision,
finding that a plaintiff needed to show more than a technical violation to
have standing.135 Sekura filed an appeal, and in September 2018, the
Appellate Court of the First District of Illinois reversed the January 2018
decision and found that the original 2017 judgment was correct—that a
plaintiff need only show a technical violation of BIPA to have
standing.136
Sekura had a tanning membership with Krishna, a tanning salon that
131. McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4; see, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing the
McCollough’s lack of actual injury as required by Article III); see also Neuburger, supra note 20
and accompanying text.
132. McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4 (“McCollough . . . has not alleged any facts to show
that her rights have been adversely affected by the violation. She is essentially claiming that the
very fact of a technical violation is the adverse effect. Accordingly, this Court finds that
McCollough also lacks statutory standing.”).
133. Id.; see also id. at *3 (“How can there be an injury from the lack of advance consent to
retain the fingerprint data beyond the rental period if there is no allegation that the information was
disclosed or at risk of disclosure?”).
134. See Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 3 (“Initially,
the trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that under the plain language of the
statute plaintiff was a person aggrieved by a violation of the Act.”); see also Insler, supra note 5,
at 37 (explaining that the court dismissed defendant’s motion).
135. See Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 3–5, 18–19 (explaining the procedural history
of this case); see, e.g., Jeffrey Neuburger, Illinois Biometric Privacy Suit Survives Dismissal Based
on Harm from Alleged Disclosure of Data to Outside Vendor, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA & TECH.
L. BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/06/21/illinois-biometricprivacy-suit-survives-dismissal-based-on-harm-from-alleged-disclosure-of-data-to-outsidevendor/ (mentioning the brief order dismissing the claims).
136. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 4–5 (holding that the trial court was initially correct);
see also IL Supreme Court Decides to Take Up Six Flags Fingerprint Privacy Case; Spurs Fresh
Rise in BIPA Lawsuits, COOK COUNTY REC. (June 29, 2018), https://cookcountyrecord.com/
stories/511470207-il-supreme-court-decides-to-take-up-six-flags-fingerprint-privacy-case-spursfresh-rise-in-bipa-lawsuits [hereinafter Fresh Rise in BIPA Lawsuits] (explaining that the Second
District Appellate Court sided with the plaintiffs, that a simple technical violation of Illinois BIPA
law is sufficient).
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used customers’ fingerprint scans for membership ID purposes.137 When
Sekura bought a tanning package with Krishna, it required her to scan her
fingerprint.138 Krishna stored these scans and disclosed them to a thirdparty vendor.139 Sekura alleged that Krishna violated BIPA by not
informing her of the purpose or length or time it would use and store her
information, for failing to inform her of its retention and destruction
policy, and by failing to obtain her written consent to collect, store, and
disclose her information to a third party. 140 Additionally, Krishna’s
franchisor had serious financial troubles, and Sekura alleged that she
suffered from emotional harm and anguish because she did not know
what would happen to her data if Krishna or its franchisor went
bankrupt.141
In 2016, Krishna moved to dismiss for a failure to state a cause of
action.142 The trial court denied its motion and found that Sekura did not
have to show damages other than the mishandling of her information in
order to be aggrieved.143 A “technical violation” was found to be
sufficient to state a claim under BIPA.144 The trial court interpreted the
137. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 7–8; see, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (describing
Sekura’s allegation that the fingerprints for identification purses were required and that she had not
been adequately informed).
138. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 7 (“When a customer first purchases services at
defendant’s tanning salon, he or she is enrolled in L.A. Tan’s national membership database, which
allows him or her to use his or her membership at any of L.A. Tan’s locations. To enroll, customers
are required to have their fingerprints scanned. In addition, defendant discloses its customer
fingerprint data to an out-of-state third-party vendor, namely, SunLync.”).
139. Id.
140. Id. ¶ 9 (“Plaintiff alleges (1) that she has never been informed of the specific purposes or
length of time for which defendant collected, stored or used her fingerprints, (2) that she has never
been informed of any biometric data retention policy developed by defendant or whether defendant
will ever permanently delete her fingerprint data, (3) that she has never been provided with nor
signed a written release allowing defendant to collect or store her fingerprints, and (4) that she has
never been provided with nor signed a written release allowing defendant to disclose her biometric
data to SunLync to or any other third party.”).
141. Id. ¶ 10–11 (“Plaintiff further alleges that, in 2013, more than 65% of L.A. Tan’s salons
were in foreclosure and that defendant’s customers have not been advised what would happen to
their biometric data if defendant’s salon went out of business. Plaintiff alleges that she becomes
emotionally upset and suffers from mental anguish when she thinks about what would happen to
her biometric data if defendant went bankrupt or out of business or if defendant’s franchisor, L.A.
Tan, went bankrupt or out of business, or if defendant shares her biometric data with others.”
(footnote omitted)).
142. Id. ¶ 14.
143. See Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (citing Sekura v. Krishna Schaumberg Tan, Inc., No. 2016
CH 4945, 2017 WL 1181420 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 2017), rev’d, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175).
144. See Sekura, 2017 WL 1181420, at *2 (“The language of BIPA itself in this respect is brief
and straightforward: it provides a cause of action for ‘any person aggrieved’ by its violation. The
most natural reading of this language alone is broad, suggesting in context that any person whose
biometric data was mishandled in violation of BIPA has a claim based on such violation.” (citation
omitted)); see also Insler, supra note 5, at 37 (explaining that the Court found actual injury was not

2019]

Litigation Rollercoaster of BIPA

1075

meaning of “aggrieved party” by looking to precedent and its use in other
statutes.145
In January 2018, Krishna moved the court to reconsider its ruling in
light of the Second District’s opinion in Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Entertainment Corp.146 The trial court granted the motion and reversed
its earlier 2017 ruling.147 In its order, the trial court cited “the reasons
outlined in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.” as its
motivation for dismissing Sekura’s claim under BIPA.148
Following this decision, Sekura appealed the trial court’s dismissal of
her claim.149 On September 28, 2018, the Appellate Court for the First
District reversed the dismissal of Sekura’s BIPA claim, finding that the
trial court was correct when it originally denied Krishna’s motion to
dismiss in 2017.150 The appellate court addressed the issue of standing
and it held that a party did not need to show harm beyond a technical
violation of the statute to be “aggrieved.”151 The court reached this
required to be aggrieved, and that a technical violation of BIPA was sufficient).
145. See Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 17 (drawing meaning for “aggrieved” by looking
at other statutes and stating, “a review of other similar statutes provides further support for the
broad intended reach of [the Act]. As the plaintiff points out in its supplemental brief on legislative
history, both the Genetic Information Privacy Act and the AIDS Confidentiality Act provide for a
substantially identical, ‘any person aggrieved’ right of recovery and have been interpreted as not
requiring actual damages be pled.” (citations omitted) (quoting Sekura, 2017 WL 1181420, at *2)).
146. Id. ¶¶ 19–20; see, e.g., Neuburger, supra note 135 (noting that the order dismissed the
claims for reasons outlined in Rosenbach). The holding in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment
Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, is discussed in note 164, infra.
147. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 20 (“On January 16, 2018, the trial court granted
defendant’s motion to reconsider and reversed its earlier ruling. Since the order is short and it is the
order being appealed from, we provide it here in full: ‘This matter coming before the Court on
Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider and adequate notice having been given, and the Court being
duly advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. For the reasons outlined in Rosenbach
v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.’” (citation omitted)); see
also Neuburger, supra note 135 (discussing that the order was very brief, but referenced
Rosenbach).
148. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 19–20. See case discussion infra note 164
(discussing the two questions for review in Rosenbach).
149. Id. ¶ 21 (Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 22, 2018); see, e.g., Scott Holland,
Appeals Panel: Cook County Judge Wrong to Toss Class Action vs LA Tan Franchisee Over
Customer Finger Scans, COOK COUNTY REC. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://cookcountyrecord.com/stories/
511585668-appeals-panel-cook-county-judge-wrong-to-toss-class-action-vs-la-tan-franchiseeover-customer-finger-scans (describing Sekura’s appeal on January 22).
150. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 21; Russel Perdew & Chethan Shetty, Biometrics:
Illinois Appellate Court Potentially Revives “No-Injury” Lawsuits Under the Biometric
Information
Privacy
Act,
JD
SUPRA
(Oct.
5,
2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/biometrics-illinois-appellate-court-93201/.
151. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 84 (“First, we find that the trial court was initially
correct and that, pursuant to both the plain language of the statute itself and its legislative history
and purpose, the Act does not require a harm in addition to a violation of the Act in order to file
suit. The Act states, very simply, that any person “aggrieved by a violation of this Act” may sue. It
does not state that a person aggrieved by a violation of this Act—plus some additional harm—may
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finding by using statutory interpretation.152 The court addressed the plain
meaning of “any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act” and found
that it did not require additional harm beyond a statutory violation.153 The
court also found that legislative intent and enforcement of similar statutes
in Illinois demonstrated that parties could sue for violation of BIPA
without proving additional harm.154 In its decision, the court addressed
Rosenbach and disagreed with its sister district’s interpretation of what
constituted an aggrieved party within the meaning of BIPA. 155 The court
also found that, even if it were to accept Rosenbach’s interpretation that
more harm than a technical violation is necessary, Sekura satisfied the
requirement because she alleged emotional injury resulting from
Krishna’s sharing of her data with a third party.156
In December 2017, Illinois’s Second District Appellate Court reached
a similar holding to the McCollough court in Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Entertainment Corp.157 Six Flags is an Illinois amusement park that
utilized biometric scanning to identify season pass holders, and
Rosenbach was the mother of a minor that visited the park.158 Six Flags
sue.” (citation omitted) (citing and interpreting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2018))).
152. Id. ¶ 41–42 (explaining that its goal in interpreting BIPA was “to ascertain the legislat[ors’]
intent, and the best indication of their intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words they
chose to use” and that in “interpreting a statute, we do not read a portion of it in isolation; instead,
we read it in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the drafters’ apparent objective
in enacting it.” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Miles, 2017 IL App (1st) 132719, ¶ 25));
see Perdew & Shetty, supra note 150 (discussing that the lack of definition for “aggrieved party”
has led to conflicting interpretations).
153. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 50; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2018)
(describing the right of action of any person aggrieved).
154. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 57, 72 (finding that “the legislative purpose and
history further supports our conclusion that plaintiff has standing to sue under the Act. . . . [O]ur
review of a statute that is similar in purpose and wording to the Act at issue further supports our
finding that plaintiff may sue for a violation of the Act without proving additional harm.”).
155. Id. ¶ 74 (holding that Rosenbach’s interpretation of “aggrieved” is unpersuasive) (citing
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 23, rev’d, 2019 IL 123186).
156. Id. ¶ 76 (“Even if we were persuaded by Rosenbach’s finding, we would still conclude that
plaintiff’s allegations in the case at bar were sufficient to support a cause of action. Unlike the
plaintiff in Rosenbach, plaintiff in our case did allege an ‘injury or adverse effect,’ as Rosenbach
required. Specifically, she alleged (1) an injury to her legal right to privacy of her own biometric
information; by the disclosure of this information to an out-of-state third party vendor, and (2)
mental anguish.” (citation omitted) (citing Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 28)).
157. See Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 28 (holding that “If a person alleges only a
technical violation of the Act without alleging any injury or adverse effect, then he or she is not
aggrieved and may not recover under any of the provisions . . . .”); see also Insler, supra note 5, at
37 (explaining that the court reviewed McCollough in its decision and followed its reasoning).
158. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶¶ 7–10; see also Radecki & Dean, supra note 46
(“The plaintiff alleged that Six Flags violated BIPA by collecting her minor son’s fingerprints at a
security checkpoint after he purchased a season pass. She claimed that Six Flags failed to provide
any written information before recording her son’s fingerprints and that she never consented to the
collection of her son’s fingerprints.”).
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fingerprinted the minor at a security checkpoint when he purchased a
season pass and collected, recorded, and stored this data.159 Rosenbach
alleged that Six Flags violated BIPA because it did not provide written
information of the specific purpose and length of time that the data would
be used, failed to obtain consent for collection, storage, and use of the
biometric data, and did not get a signed release regarding the fingerprint
data.160 Rosenbach did not, however, allege that Six Flags sold or
mishandled her son’s biometric data.161
Six Flags moved to dismiss, arguing that Rosenbach lacked standing
because BIPA requires that a party show actual harm to be considered
aggrieved.162 The trial court denied Six Flag’s motion, but later granted
its motion for reconsideration and certified questions to the appellate
court.163
The Second District Appellate Court’s review focused on whether a
party was “aggrieved” under BIPA when the only injury alleged was a
violation of notice and consent requirements.164 Ultimately, the court
found for Six Flags, concluding that, because Rosenbach alleged only a
technical violation of BIPA, she was not aggrieved and therefore did not
have standing.165 To reach its decision, the appellate court examined case

159. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶¶ 7–10 (“When Alexander purchased his season
pass, he went to the security checkpoint at the park and his thumb was scanned into the Six Flags
‘biometric data capture system.’ Then he went to the administrative building to obtain a seasonpass card to use in conjunction with his thumbprint scan to gain access to the park.”); see also, e.g.,
Radecki & Dean, supra note 46; see Private Rights of Action, supra note 115 (describing when the
fingerprints were collected for security purposes without obtaining consent).
160. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 8 (“Plaintiff alleged that she did not consent in
writing to the collection, storage, use, sale, lease, dissemination, disclosure, redisclosure, or trade
of, or for Six Flags to otherwise profit from, Alexander’s thumbprint ‘or associated biometric
identifiers or information.’”); see also, e.g., Radecki & Dean, supra note 46 (recounting the
fingerprint recordation); see Private Rights of Action, supra note 115 (noting that the fingerprints
were collected without obtaining consent).
161. See Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 10 (“Plaintiff alleged not that she or
Alexander suffered any actual injury, but that, had she known of defendants’ conduct, ‘she never
would have purchased a season pass for her son.’”); see also Radecki & Dean, supra note 46
(explaining that plaintiff did not allege mishandling of her son’s data).
162. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 12.
163. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
164. See id. ¶ 15 (“[T]he trial court . . . certified the following two questions for our review: (1)
whether an individual is an aggrieved person under section 20 of the Act and may seek statutory
liquidated damages . . . when the only injury he or she alleges is a violation . . . of the Act by a
private entity that collected his or her biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without
providing him or her the disclosures and obtaining the written consent required by . . . the Act and
(2) whether an individual is an aggrieved person under section 20 of the Act and may seek
injunctive relief . . . when the only injury he or she alleges is a violation . . . of the Act by a private
entity that collected his or her biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without providing
him or her the disclosures and obtaining the written consent required.”).
165. Id. ¶ 28.
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law and legislative intent to interpret the word “aggrieved.”166 The court
found that BIPA requires plaintiffs to “allege some actual harm” instead
of merely showing that a defendant failed to comply with the statutory
requirements.167 The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Illinois
Supreme Court.168
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed to take the Rosenbach appeal on
May 30, 2018, and heard oral arguments on November 20, 2018.169 At
oral argument, both parties focused on the word “aggrieved” and
discussed the statutory construction and legislative intent of BIPA.170
Rosenbach’s counsel referred to the First District’s holding in Sekura
throughout his argument and urged the Illinois Supreme Court to reach a
similar conclusion.171 During argument, the justices raised concern
regarding Six Flags’s argument that actual harm was necessary to bring
suit under BIPA.172 The justices discussed BIPA’s goal of preventing
166. Id. ¶ 23 (The Court also interpreted the legislative intent and concluded that “if the Illinois
legislature intended to allow for a private cause of action for every technical violation of the Act,
it could have omitted the word ‘aggrieved’ and stated that every violation was actionable. A
determination that a technical violation of the statute is actionable would render the word
‘aggrieved’ superfluous.”) (referencing the finding in McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C
03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016)).
167. Id. ¶ 1; see, e.g., Insler, supra note 5, at 37.
168. See Steven Grimes & Eric J. Shinabarger, Illinois Supreme Court to Hear BIPA Standing
Case, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L. BLOG (July 10, 2018),
https://www.winston.com/en/privacy-law-corner/illinois-supreme-court-to-hear-bipa-standingcase.html (discussing the upcoming Illinois Supreme Court case); see, e.g., Fresh Rise in BIPA
Lawsuits, supra note 136 (discussing that Illinois Supreme court is opening the question again);
Perdew & Shetty, supra note 150 (discussing that the plaintiff likely would appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court).
169. E.g., Neuburger, supra note 135 (describing the Rosenbach decision on May 30); Winston
Luo, Rosenbach v. Six Flags: Oral Arguments Heard on Case Determining Standing Under
Illinois Biometric Privacy Law, HARV. J.L. & TECH.: JOLTDIGEST (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/rosenbach-v-six-flags-oral-arguments-heard-on-casedetermining-standing-under-illinois-biometric-privacy-law (noting that oral arguments were heard
on November 20, 2018).
170. See Luo, supra note 169 (summarizing that the attorneys for Rosenbach argued that
aggrieved means “aggrieved” means “deprived of a legal right” while the Six Flags attorneys
argued that a person must be “adversely affected” or “harmed”); see also Gallo, supra note 28
(explaining that both parties looked to legislative intent and statutory construction of 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 14/1).
171. See Amy Harwath, The Fight over Standing under the Biometric Information Privacy Act
Continues in Illinois High Court, SHEPPARD MULLIN: LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/privacy/biometric-informationprivacy-act-notice-and-consent/ (“The recent Sekura decision played a significant role in the
Rosenbach parties’ oral arguments before the Illinois Supreme Court on November 20. During
arguments, Rosenbach’s counsel relied on the First District’s opinion that BIPA’s statutory
language ‘does not state that a person aggrieved by a violation of this act—plus some additional
harm—may sue.’”).
172. See Lauraann Wood, Ill. Justices Doubt Six Flags’ View in Biometric Data Case, LAW360
(Nov. 20, 2018, 5:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1103847/ill-justices-doubt-six-flagsview-in-biometric-data-case (noting that “[a]t least three of the court’s seven justices seemed
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future harm and questioned whether privacy protection would be
compromised if a technical violation of the statute was not sufficient to
bring a claim under BIPA.173
On January 25, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Group.174 In a
unanimous decision, the court held a person is “aggrieved” when there is
a technical violation of BIPA; a showing of further harm is not necessary
to bring a cause of action under the statute.175
III. ILLINOIS’S SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN
Before the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbach, the state
of BIPA litigation was uncertain because of conflicting interpretations at
the intermediate appellate level.176 In one district, a party was not
“aggrieved” unless it demonstrated harm beyond a statutory violation,
while in another, it was sufficient for a party to merely allege a statutory
violation.177 The Rosenbach decision is significant because it provides
clarity on standing under BIPA, is binding on Illinois and federal courts,
and lowers the burden for plaintiffs bringing a suit under BIPA.178
The Illinois Supreme Court found that a violation of BIPA’s technical
requirements alone supports a cause of action under BIPA, and showing
further harm is not necessary to bring a claim.179 To reach this decision,
the court analyzed the plain meaning of the statute, other Illinois statutes,
Illinois precedent, and legislative intent to determine the meaning of
skeptical” of Six Flags’s argument).
173. Id. (quoting Justice Burke as saying it was “‘too late to wait’ for the compromise to happen
once a person’s biometrics have been collected without their informed consent because at that point,
‘they can’t do anything about it . . . . They may never know, and you can’t get your fingerprints
back. It’s irreparable harm.’”); see also Luo, supra note 169 (noting that punishment after an actual
injury, such as an inappropriate disclosure or data breach, would be “too late”); see also Harwath,
supra note 171 (quoting Judge Thomas, who stated, “If we were to . . . agree with your position on
this case, . . . wouldn’t that remove the incentive and urgency for entities to secure data?”).
174. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186.
175. Id. ¶ 40; Chmielewski et al., supra note 30.
176. Perdew & Shetty, supra note 150 (explaining how “person aggrieved” was not defined in
the statute, causing confusion among the courts).
177. See Alfred Saikali, New Biometric Privacy Decision Creates More Risk for Companies
Doing Business in Illinois, JD SUPRA (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/newbiometric-privacy-decision-creates-25758/ (describing different holdings in Illinois’s First and
Second Districts).
178. See, e.g., Perdew & Shetty, supra note 150 (describing how “person aggrieved” was not
previously defined in the statute and how the decision provided clarity); see also Gallo, supra note
28 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a split among lower courts); Wood,
supra note 172 (“While only Rosenbach’s case is before the state high court, its ruling either way
is teed up to set the standard for who can and cannot bring a lawsuit under BIPA going forward.”).
179. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40; see Chmielewski et al., supra note 30 (explaining the
Court’s holding).
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“aggrieved.”180 This analysis was consistent with the methods the
McCollough, Sekura, and lower Rosenbach courts used in their
assessments.181 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision is similar to the
decision reached in Sekura, and upholds the intent of the Illinois
legislature and essence of BIPA.182
A. The Plain Meaning of Aggrieved
The Rosenbach court first interpreted the plain meaning of BIPA’s
language to decide if Rosenbach had standing. In examining this
language, the court held that BIPA’s plain meaning did not require a
showing of harm beyond a violation of the statute.183 To reach this
conclusion, the court observed that BIPA’s plain language—“Any person
aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action”—did not
require a showing of harm beyond a technical violation, and refused to
read a more demanding standard than appeared on the face of BIPA. 184
To find BIPA required a showing of actual harm where none was listed
would have required the court to disregard the plain and unambiguous
language of the law.185 The logic of the Rosenbach decision is simple and
straightforward; Illinois precedent informs that the best indication of a
drafter’s intent is the plain meaning of the words chosen.186 Because
BIPA simply states “aggrieved by violation,” it naturally follows the
legislature intended to provide private parties with a cause of action for
mere statutory violations, and the Rosenbach court correctly interpreted
the plain language without adding superfluous language that was not

180. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24; see Chmielewski et al., supra note 30 (“In reaching its
decision, the court first looked to the legislative intent, explaining that the Act vests in individuals
and customers the right to control their biometric data by requiring notice before collection and
giving them the power to say no by withholding consent.”).
181. See, e.g., McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 18,
rev’d, 2019 IL 123186; Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 49.
182. See, e.g., Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175 (holding that BIPA did not require a showing
of harm beyond a statutory violation).
183. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40 (“Contrary to the appellate court’s view, an individual
need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under the
Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek liquidated damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”).
184. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2018); Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24.
185. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 38.
186. See id. ¶ 24 (“When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we may not depart
from the law’s terms by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not
express, nor may we add provisions not found in the law.” (citing Acme Markets, Inc. v. Callanan,
923 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. 2009))); see also Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 50 (“‘[T]he best
indication’ of the drafters’ intent is ‘the plain and ordinary meaning of the words they chose to
use.’” (citing People v. Miles, 2017 IL App (1st) 132719, ¶ 40)).
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originally included.187
In aid of its attempt to give “any person aggrieved” its plain meaning,
the Rosenbach court consulted the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary for a definition of the word
“aggrieved.”188 Merriam-Webster defines “aggrieved” as “suffering from
an infringement or denial of legal rights,” and Black’s Law defines it as
“having legal rights that are adversely affected.”189 These definitions
supported the court’s ultimate conclusion that under BIPA, a party is
aggrieved when his legal right was violated. Harm beyond a statutory
violation is not required.
This court’s interpretation of BIPA’s plain meaning closely mirrors the
analysis in Sekura.190 First, the Sekura court observed that BIPA simply
allows an “aggrieved party” to sue and an allegation of additional harm
is not required.191 The court held that if BIPA drafters had intended to
require additional harm, they could have explicitly stated it.192 Because
the drafters did not state an additional harm requirement, the court in
Sekura found that the plain language supported the plaintiff. 193 The
Sekura court also consulted Black’s Law Dictionary to inform its
interpretation and found that BIPA gave the plaintiff “legal rights” which
were “adversely affected” when the Act was violated; a showing of
further harm was unnecessary.194
Overall, the Illinois Supreme Court’s reading of BIPA’s language is
logical. It is consistent with the plain language of BIPA because it does
not add an injury requirement where there is none, and it ultimately
respects the underlying intent of the law—to protect the citizens of
Illinois’s sensitive biometric data.
B. Intent of the Illinois Legislature: What Is the Purpose of BIPA?
At the core of the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of BIPA was
187. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20.
188. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 32.
189. Id. (citing Aggrieved, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006),
and Aggrieved, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
190. Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175.
191. Id. ¶ 50.
192. Id. (“If the drafters had intended to limit the pool of plaintiffs to those plaintiffs who had
been both aggrieved by a violation of the Act and aggrieved by some additional harm or injury,
they could have easily stated that.”).
193. Id. (noting that the Illinois legislature “chose to state only ‘a violation of this Act.’ Thus,
the plain language of the Act supports plaintiff’s right to sue” (citation omitted)).
194. Id. ¶ 52 (“In other words, the Act provides plaintiff with ‘legal rights’ that she alleges were
‘adversely affected’ by the Act’s violation. Defendant quotes this definition in its brief to this court,
and we agree that it is persuasive. But applying the words of this definition to the facts of this case
supports plaintiff’s right to sue.”).
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an examination of the intent of the legislature.195 By analyzing the
legislature’s intent, the court sought to respect and further the purpose of
BIPA, and to apply the legislature’s intent to inform the meaning of
“aggrieved.”196 Through this analysis, the Supreme Court found that the
Illinois legislature did not intend plaintiffs to have to show harm beyond
a statutory violation.197
In exploring the intent of the legislature, this court reviewed the
General Assembly’s assessment of the risks posed by the growing use of
biometrics by businesses.198 In 740 ILCS 14/5, the General Assembly
noted the unique and precious nature of biometric information and
expressed concern over the lack of recourse an individual had if the
information was compromised.199 The court found that the Illinois
legislature was particularly concerned about these risks because “[t]he
full ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known.” 200
Keeping this concern in mind, the court found that the legislature
intended to prevent possible damage, not merely remedy past
violations.201 In order to accomplish this goal, the court observed that
BIPA imposes strict safeguards on the collection and protection of data
and subjects entities to liability regardless of whether actual damages
beyond a violation of the law are shown.202 The combination of the
General Assembly’s “stated purpose” and structure of the Act
demonstrated to the court that the legislature meant BIPA to be a
protective and deterrent law.203 To find that BIPA required an additional
showing of harm beyond a statutory violation would be “antithetical” to
the purpose that the legislature envisioned.204
The Illinois Supreme Court’s reasoning is supported by a similar
finding in the Sekura court. The court in Sekura utilized legislative
history and records in its interpretation of the legislature’s intent to
195. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 35.
196. Id. ¶¶ 33–35 (discussing standing under BIPA and connecting it with the legislative intent
of the General Assembly).
197. Id. ¶ 34 (“When a private entity fails to adhere to the statutory procedures, as defendants
are alleged to have done here, ‘the right of the individual to maintain [his or] her biometric privacy
vanishes into thin air. The precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to prevent is then realized.’
This is no mere ‘technicality.’ The injury is real and significant.” (citation omitted) (quoting Patel
v. Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)).
198. Id. ¶ 35.
199. See id. (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c)’s provision regarding the unique nature of
biometric information that can result in stolen identities and other risks if compromised).
200. Id. (alteration in original) (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(f) (2018)).
201. Id. ¶ 36 (finding that the strategy of the legislature was to “head off” problems before they
occurred).
202. Id.
203. Id. ¶ 37 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5).
204. Id.
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conclude that a mere statutory violation of BIPA created an “aggrieved”
person.205 The decision described the highly sensitive, individualized
nature of biometric data and reasonable fear of Illinois citizens in the
collection of this data because the full ramifications of its use are
unknown.206 The court also noted that individuals were left with no
recourse after their data is compromised, except to sue for damages—
which are tenuous—and that the legislators enacted BIPA to prevent a
compromise in the first place.207 The court found that BIPA was intended
to be proactive, rather than reactive because BIPA’s “goal is to prevent
irretrievable harm from happening and to put in place a process and rules
to reassure an otherwise skittish public.”208 The Sekura court also held
that forcing a member of the public to wait until after an “irretrievable
harm” occurred in order to sue would “confound the very purpose of the
Act.”209 As such, the court held that BIPA is not meant to provide redress
only for individuals whose information has already been compromised;
rather, BIPA is meant to hold companies accountable so that breaches do
not occur.210
The Illinois Supreme Court also rebuked the holding of the lower
Rosenbach court. The court below conducted a close reading of the
statutory language to deduce the legislative intent.211 In so doing, the
lower court found that the legislature intended for the term “aggrieved”
to be synonymous with “injured.”212 The court determined that “if the
Illinois legislature intended to allow for a private cause of action for every
technical violation of the Act, it could have omitted the word ‘aggrieved’
205. Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 57–58 (“While we
do not find that the words were ambiguous, we do find that the legislative purpose and history
further supports our conclusion that plaintiff has standing to sue under the Act. The legislative
purpose is easy to discern because the legislators provided a section in the Act entitled: ‘Legislative
findings; intent.’” (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5)).
206. Id. ¶¶ 62–65 (“So, we are in very serious need of protections for the citizens of Illinois
when it comes to biometric information. I know of no opposition to the legislation and I’ll attempt
to answer any questions.” (quoting H.R. Debate Transcript, 95th Gen. Assemb. No. 276, at 249 (Ill.
2008) (statement of Rep. Kathy Ryg)).
207. Id. ¶ 59 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5).
208. Id. ¶¶ 59, 64 (“Representative Ryg’s remarks establish that the primary impetus behind the
bill was to alleviate the fears of ‘thousands of customers . . . wondering what will become of their
biometric and financial data’ and to provide them with protections.” (omission in original) (quoting
H.R. Debate Transcript, 95th Gen. Assemb. No. 276, at 249 (Ill. 2008) (statement of Rep. Kathy
Ryg))).
209. Id. ¶ 59 (holding that Defendant’s position is inconsistent with the legislature’s stated goal
of preventing compromise of information).
210. See, e.g., id.
211. See, e.g., McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 1, 2016); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 23 (analyzing
word choice in statute to determine legislature’s intent), rev’d, 2019 IL 123186.
212. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶¶ 22–23.
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and stated that every violation was actionable.”213
Essentially, the lower court found that the word “aggrieved” would be
superfluous if the legislature had intended to make a technical violation
actionable, and therefore, an individual who asserts a technical violation
without further injury was not an aggrieved person.214 The appellate court
did not cite to the legislative history of BIPA, nor did it extrapolate on
the state of privacy regulation in Illinois at the time that BIPA was
enacted.215 The court briefly mentioned the “Legislative Intent” section
of BIPA, describing the Act’s purpose as “to provide standards of conduct
for private entities in connection with the collection and possession of
biometric identifiers and biometric information.”216 But, it did not
connect this section to its interpretation of “aggrieved.”217
The Illinois Supreme Court emphatically dismissed the lower court’s
findings on the legislature’s intent and found that the lower court’s
characterization of a BIPA violation as merely “technical” minimized the
harm that the legislature sought to combat.218 The right of an individual
to control the use of his deeply personal biometric information is central
to the purpose of BIPA, and the deprivation of this ability is the “precise
harm the Illinois legislature sought to prevent.” 219 As such, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the notion that further harm needed to be
demonstrated, as the injury of losing control over biometric privacy is
“real and significant” by itself.220
The Illinois Supreme Court was correct to overturn the lower court’s
decision because the lower court failed to take a comprehensive view of
the legislature’s intent. Instead of examining the history and
circumstances under which the Illinois legislature passed BIPA, the
decision solely relied upon a close statutory reading to construe the intent
behind the word “aggrieved.”221 The lower court’s approach was
213. Id. ¶ 23.
214. Id.
215. See id. ¶¶ 19–23 (conducting a close reading of the language in the statute, but not
conducting an examination of the atmosphere in which BIPA was created).
216. Id. ¶ 4 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2018)).
217. See id. ¶ 19 (discussing the legislative intent without reference to 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
14/5).
218. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 34 (observing that the
appellate court’s finding that the violation was “merely ‘technical’” misapprehends the nature of
the harm our legislature is attempting to combat through this legislation).
219. See id. (finding that losing a right to privacy is the exact harm that the legislature sought
to avoid).
220. Id.
221. See Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 23 (speculating that the word “aggrieved”
would be superfluous if used to describe a statutory violation and concluding that it must therefore
be synonymous to “injury”).
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misguided because it failed to consider the sensitive nature of biometric
data, the uncertainty regarding protection of the data, and its increasing
use in business. As discussed in the Illinois Senate and embodied
explicitly in statutory language, BIPA was passed to protect Illinois
citizens from potential breaches, and is a proactive statute, rather than a
retroactive one.222 Instead of addressing these issues, the lower court
relied on less persuasive points to analyze the word “aggrieved.”
The Illinois Supreme Court’s reasoning is persuasive because it places
high importance on the legislative intent of BIPA. 223 This evidence is
important because precedent places great weight on legislative intent
when conducting statutory interpretation.224 Additionally, the legislature
clearly stated its intent in the legislative reasoning section of BIPA, and
the Rosenbach court’s analysis of this section was logical and gave the
legislature’s intent its proper weight. The court’s holding that the
legislature did not intend for an “aggrieved party” to have suffered an
injury beyond a statutory violation is strongly rooted in BIPA’s
legislative history.225 Its decision honors the intent of the legislature and
provides the intended protection of consumer information.
C. Construction of Other Illinois Statutes
In its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court also analyzed the
construction of other Illinois statutes to aid its interpretation of the word
“aggrieved.”226 Its review of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practice Act and the AIDS Confidentiality Act supported the
court’s finding that harm beyond the violation of BIPA is not necessary
222. See H.R. Debate Transcript, 95th Gen. Assemb. No. 276, at 249 (Ill. 2008) (statement of
Rep. Kathy Ryg) (describing the Illinois legislature’s intent to protect sensitive data); see also 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (BIPA’s described goal is to safeguard information).
223. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c).
224. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 19 (“Defendants’ argument raises a question of
statutory construction, which invokes well-settled principles. Our primary objective in construing
a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, and the surest and most reliable
indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language itself.” (citing
People v. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896)); see also Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL
App (1st) 180175, ¶ 42 (“‘When interpreting a statute, we do not read a portion of it in isolation;
instead, we read it in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the drafters’ apparent
objective in enacting it.’ When considering the drafters’ objective, we examine the problems that
the legislature intended to remedy with the law and the consequences of construing it one way or
the other.” (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Miles, 2017 IL App (1st) 132719, ¶ 25))
(referencing extensive Illinois legislative history).
225. See Sekura, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 57 (“If the words of a statute are ambiguous, and
only if they are ambiguous, may we turn to other aides, such as legislative history. While we do not
find that the words were ambiguous, we do find that the legislative purpose and history further
supports our conclusion that plaintiff has standing to sue under the Act.” (citations omitted)).
226. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 25–26 (citing 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/10a(a) (2018), and 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305 (2018)).
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to be “aggrieved.”227
The court first examined the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practice Act.228 In this statute, the language plainly states that in order to
bring a claim, an aggrieved party must suffer actual damage beyond a
violation.229 The Rosenbach court interpreted this to mean that when the
Illinois legislature intends to require such a showing of damages, it makes
that intention clear.230 Because BIPA does not contain such language, the
court found that the drafters did not intend to require damage beyond a
statutory violation.231 Contrarily, Illinois’s AIDS Confidentiality Act
does not provide any requirement for actual harm beyond a statutory
violation.232 It offers a private right of action for a party “aggrieved” by
a violation of the statute but does not define “aggrieved.”233 In Doe v.
Chand, the Fifth District Appellate Court found that proof of actual
damages was not required to recover under the statute.234 The Rosenbach
court viewed the Fifth District’s interpretation of the AIDS
Confidentiality Act as “instructive” to its interpretation of the similarly
worded standing language in BIPA.235 Comparing the AIDS
Confidentiality Act to BIPA aided in the Rosenbach court’s decision that
a plaintiff is not required to show harm beyond a statutory violation.
The Sekura court also conducted a comparison of BIPA to the AIDS
Confidentiality Act. The Sekura court’s analysis differed slightly, but
ultimately it reached a similar decision to the court in Rosenbach. In
Sekura, the court noted two important similarities between BIPA and the
AIDS Confidentiality Act.236 First, the AIDS Confidentiality Act
employs similar “right of action” statutory language to BIPA, including
the offering of a right of action to “[a]ny person aggrieved by a

227. Id.
228. Id. ¶ 25 (citing 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a(a)).
229. Id. (citing 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a(a), which states that “[a]ny person who suffers
actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed by any other person may bring an
action against such person.” This statute requires damage beyond a violation of a statute.).
230. Id. (“When the General Assembly has wanted to impose such a requirement in other
situations, it has made that intention clear.”).
231. Id. ¶ 26 (referencing 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305).
232. Id. (citing 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/13).
233. Id. ¶ 29 (comparing BIPA by stating, “As with the AIDS Confidentiality Act, the Act does
not contain its own definition of what it means to be ‘aggrieved’ by a violation of the law.”).
234. Id. ¶ 26 (citing Doe v. Chand, 781 N.E.2d 340, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), which found that
proof of actual damages is not required to recover).
235. Id. ¶ 28 (noting that the Fifth Circuit’s decision is not “dispositive,” but nonetheless
provided support for the Supreme Court’s opinion).
236. See Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 68 (comparing
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 to the AIDS Confidentiality Act by stating, “Of the various statutes,
the closest one for comparison’s sake is the AIDS Confidentiality Act.”).

2019]

Litigation Rollercoaster of BIPA

1087

violation.”237 Second, the court in Sekura found that the purposes of the
AIDS Confidentiality Act and BIPA were similar.238 The court
determined the legislative purpose of the AIDS Confidentiality Act was
to “relieve the fears of people about being tested for AIDS and to protect
against unauthorized disclosure.”239 The Sekura court held that BIPA’s
purpose was similar because its intent was to relieve the fears of using
and relying on new technology and to protect against unauthorized
disclosure.240 Because of the similarities between the AIDS
Confidentiality Act and BIPA in both statutory language and purpose, the
court in Sekura applied the “aggrieved party” definition under the AIDS
Confidentiality Act to BIPA and held that a technical violation created an
aggrieved party under both.241
The comparison of BIPA to the AIDS Confidentiality Act is logical
due to the similarities in language and overall purpose. Under Illinois law,
courts can turn to other codes when such codes have similar goals and
subjects.242 The Rosenbach court’s careful comparison provided a strong
reference point.
D. Illinois Case Law
This Rosenbach court also found support for its holding in Illinois
Supreme Court precedent.243 Specifically, the court analyzed prior
interpretations of the word “aggrieved.”244 These cases supported the
237. Id. ¶ 69 (alteration in original). The court stated as follows:
Both sections provide recovery against a person who “negligently violates a provision
of this Act” or “intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act.” Both provide
for liquidated or actual damages, “whichever is greater.” Both sections provide for
reasonable attorney fees, as well as “other relief, including an injunction.”
Id. (citations omitted) (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2018), and 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/13).
238. See id. ¶ 70 (comparing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5, and 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 and
stating, “In addition, the two statutes have similar purposes.”).
239. Id. (referencing 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2(2)).
240. Id. (“In both situations, disclosure can create irreparable harm.”).
241. Id. ¶ 72 (“Thus, our review of a statute that is similar in purpose and wording to the Act at
issue further supports our finding that plaintiff may sue for a violation of the Act without proving
additional harm.”).
242. Id. ¶ 67 (“[W]hile we may turn to other codes, we should only do so when the codes share
similar goals and related subjects . . . [A] statute should be ‘construed in conjunction with other
statutes touching on the same or related subjects’ ‘considering the reason and necessity for the law,
the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be obtained.’” (first alteration in original)
(quoting Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 71)).
243. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 30–31 (citing Glos v. People,
102 N.E. 763 (Ill. 1913); Am. Surety Co. v. Jones, 51 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1943); In re Estate of
Hinshaw, 153 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); In re Estate of Harmston, 295 N.E.2d 66 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1973); Greeling v. Abendroth, 813 N.E.2d 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
244. Id. ¶ 30.
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finding that the violation of a statute without further harm can create an
aggrieved party.245 Illinois precedent informs that a party can be
aggrieved when they suffer a denial of a personal or property right. 246 A
person who suffers actual damages as the result of a violation of his rights
would meet this definition, but sustaining such damages is not necessary
to qualify as “aggrieved.”247 Rather, Illinois courts look to see if a
person’s legal rights have been invaded.248 This meaning of the term
“aggrieved” is “embedded” in Illinois jurisprudence, and the Illinois
Supreme Court was not persuaded to find otherwise.249 Additionally, the
court concluded that this definition is so well settled in Illinois law that
the authors of BIPA must have known of the precedent and intended for
the word “aggrieved” to have such meaning.250
These references are more helpful than the analysis conducted by the
lower Rosenbach court. The lower court relied on two federal district
court cases, McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc. and Vigil v. Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc., that found a technical violation did not create
standing under BIPA.251 Although federal court opinions interpreting
state law are not binding on Illinois courts, the court in Rosenbach found
their analyses to be persuasive.252 The Illinois Supreme Court, on the
other hand, correctly placed greater weight on Illinois precedent, making
for a more relevant and convincing analysis and holding.253 The meaning
of BIPA’s “aggrieved party” provision is best informed by the state of the
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Glos, 102 N.E. at 766 and stating that “[a] person is prejudiced or aggrieved, in
the legal sense, when a legal right is invaded by the act complained of or his pecuniary interest is
directly affected by the decree or judgment.”).
247. Id. (“A person who suffers actual damages as the result of the violation of his or her rights
would meet this definition of course, but sustaining such damages is not necessary to qualify as
‘aggrieved.’”).
248. Id.
249. Id. ¶ 31 (finding that this understanding of “aggrieved” has been used frequently by Illinois
courts).
250. Id. (“We must presume that the legislature was aware of that precedent and acted
accordingly.” (citing People v. Cole, 2017 IL 120997, ¶ 30, which observed that “when statutes are
enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with
knowledge of the prevailing case law”)).
251. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 21 (stating that in
McCollough, “the plaintiff sought damages stemming from violations of the Act. . . . [T]he district
court held that, by alleging a technical violation of the Act, the plaintiff did not meet that definition,
because she had not alleged any facts to show that her rights had been adversely affected by the
violation.” (citing McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016))), rev’d, 2019 IL 123186; see also id. (citing Vigil v. Take-Two Interactive
Software, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 499, 519–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)).
252. See id. (“While cases from lower federal courts are not binding, we may consider their
analyses persuasive.”).
253. See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 31 (citing five Illinois cases as it assessed how to
interpret the meaning of “aggrieved”).
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law in Illinois at the time the Act was passed. The fact that “aggrieved”
had a commonly known definition at the time of passage strongly
suggests that the legislature created the statute with this definition in
mind.254 Additionally, the court followed the precedent of Illinois state
courts rather than following the nonbinding decisions of federal courts.255
Overall, the Rosenbach decision is sound as it closely follows Illinois
precedent and reflects the Illinois legislature’s intent to protect consumers
proactively rather than retroactively. The court recognized that the
Illinois legislature intended to protect the information of its citizens, and
the court conducted analysis that was consistent with Illinois rules of
statutory construction to find that a technical violation of BIPA creates
an aggrieved party.
IV. IMPACTS OF THE ROSENBACH DECISION
On January 25, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.256 This decision
resolved the inter-district split over whether a person must allege an
injury beyond a procedural violation of BIPA in order to be
“aggrieved.”257 The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately found in favor of
a generous grant of standing to those that allege a mere technical violation
rather than the more onerous showing of actual injury. The Rosenbach
decision will have a significant impact on litigation and enforcement of
BIPA in both Illinois state and federal courts across the country. 258 The
low standing threshold of an “aggrieved party” will also affect businesses
that employ the use of biometric technology, as they will need to ensure
that they are in compliance with the statute or else face serious liability
from individual and class action litigation.259 Additionally, Illinois may
254. Id. (stating that “[w]e must presume that the legislature was aware of that precedent and
acted accordingly”) (citing Cole, 2017 IL 120997, ¶ 30).
255. The lower Rosenbach court cited McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, and Vigil, 235 F. Supp.
3d 499, both of which were federal cases.
256. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186.
257. Id. ¶ 40 (holding that “an individual need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect,
beyond violation of his or her rights under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and
be entitled to seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”).
258. See, e.g., Perdew & Shetty, supra note 150 (discussing the implications of the decision);
see also Cynthia J. Larose & Elana Safner, No Harm, Still a Foul: Illinois Supreme Court Rules on
the Collection of Biometric Data, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/no-harm-still-foul-illinois-supreme-court-rules-collection-biometric-data (observing that
this ruling will have a large impact on future litigation and will create a “boon” for plaintiffs); Mira
Baylson et al., Rosenbach v. Six Flags - Illinois Supreme Court Takes Expansive View of Statutory
Standing Under the Biometric Information Privacy Act, JD SUPRA (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/rosenbach-v-six-flags-illinois-supreme-86315/ (finding that
this decision will likely increase the amount of lawsuits under BIPA).
259. See Ambrose McCall, Following Supreme Court Decision, It’s High Time for Illinois
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soon be joined by other states who seek to implement measures similar
to BIPA as there is growing awareness of the importance of biometric
privacy. Lastly, this decision is a major victory for consumers because it
offers the most robust protection of their sensitive data as well as
substantive recourse when their privacy rights are violated.
A. The Effect on Litigation
The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision will have a major impact on
litigation under BIPA because the low standing threshold will inevitably
lead to an increase in the types and number of claims that are brought.260
Opponents of Rosenbach reasonably fear that a wave of frivolous
lawsuits will follow this decision.261 However, this decision will also
positively impact future litigation by providing clarity on the matter of
standing.
Those opposed to the Rosenbach decision fear it will lead to a chaotic
increase in class action suits or a potential floodgate in litigation.262
Critics argue that Illinois will become a “gotcha” state, in which potential
plaintiffs actively seek to catch potential offenders in procedural
mistakes.263 This is a valid concern; the private right of action coupled
Employers to Review Workplace Biometric Privacy Issues, JD SUPRA (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/following-supreme-court-decision-it-s-20018/ (stating that in
light of this recent decision, there is heightened importance for employers to comply with BIPA);
see also Jeff John Roberts, Court’s Biometrics Ruling Poses Billion Dollar Risk to Facebook,
Google, FORTUNE (Jan. 28, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/01/28/facebook-face-scanning-bipa/
(noting that companies that violate BIPA could be subject to “enormous” fines if involved in class
actions).
260. See Larose & Safner, supra note 258 (“More than 100 businesses accused of violating
BIPA have closely watched the case, and it is likely the ruling may embolden plaintiffs’ attorneys
to add to the over 200 BIPA cases brought in Illinois state courts. Many of these cases were stayed
in anticipation of the Rosenbach decision.”); see also Allison Grande, Ill. Biometric Ruling a Boon
to Plaintiffs, Yet Questions Linger, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2019, 10:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1122234/ill-biometric-ruling-a-boon-to-plaintiffs-yet-questions-linger (“The recent influx
of litigation under Illinois’ unique Biometric Information Privacy Act is set to intensify . . . .”).
261. See Grande, supra note 260 (“The ruling is expected to embolden plaintiffs’ attorneys to
continue to pad a BIPA docket that already exceeds 200 cases . . . .”); see also Baylson et al., supra
note 258 (observing that this could lead to many more suits filed even if such suits do not claim an
alleged loss).
262. See Perdew & Shetty, supra note 150 (describing a wave of class action litigation); see
also Brief of Amicus Curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce in Support of Defendant-Appellees
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation and Great America LLC at 4, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t
Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317 (No. SC123186), 2018 WL 5777926 (“Reversal of the Appellate
Court’s decision will open the floodgates for future litigation at the expense of Illinois’ commercial
health.”).
263. See Grande, supra note 260 (citing one commentator who remarked, “With their ruling
today, the Illinois Supreme Court has decided that BIPA is a ‘gotcha’ statute, and if businesses
don’t use the magic words when using biometric technology, then they’re going to be looking at
hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars in exposure.”); see also Roberts, supra note 259
(observing that companies could lose billions in a major class action suit).
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with a smaller hurdle for plaintiff’s attorneys—who are entitled to fees
and costs if victorious—will undoubtedly attract more litigation.264
However, the Rosenbach decision provides the necessary clarity to
lower Illinois courts that were split over the “aggrieved party” provision
of BIPA.265 The Rosenbach holding provides lower courts with a brightline standing requirement, which will avoid squandering judicial
resources on lengthy procedural motions. Parties doing business in
Illinois or with Illinois citizens are now fully aware that in order to collect
and keep biometric data, they must be fully compliant with BIPA’s
technical requirements governing retention, collection, disclosure, and
destruction of such data, otherwise they face significant liability. 266 Prior
to Rosenbach, the courts struggled to come to a clear answer on which
types of injury were sufficient to grant standing under BIPA, and
grappled with where to draw the line on standing.267 The lack of clarity
and its consequences were evident in Sekura.268 Although Sekura found
that a showing of injury beyond statutory violation was unnecessary, the
Sekura court still observed that the plaintiff had suffered an actual
injury.269 The court found that the plaintiff’s “mental anguish” and the
sharing of data to a third-party vendor constituted an adverse effect,
which can be grounds to find someone an “aggrieved party.”270 However,
legal commentators observed that emotional harm was likely insufficient
to show actual injury under BIPA.271 Moving forward, there will be less
264. See Chmielewski et al., supra note 30 (surmising that this ruling will come as “welcome
news to plaintiffs’ attorneys” because there are now “fewer impediments to pursue no-injury class
action lawsuits under BIPA”); see also Grande, supra note 260 (observing that one plaintiff’s firm
is planning to resume forty-five cases it had stayed while waiting for the court to decide this case).
265. See Larose & Safner, supra note 258 (stating that the meaning of aggrieved is finally
settled); see also Michael McGivney et al., Biometrics: Illinois Supreme Court Allows No-Injury
Biometric Information Privacy Act Claims in Complete Victory for Plaintiffs’ Bar, JD SUPRA (Jan.
28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/biometrics-illinois-supreme-court-86872/ (“The
Supreme Court in Rosenbach gave a clear and final answer that will be binding on all courts that
consider BIPA claims: plaintiffs need only allege a statutory violation to have a private right of
action and an ability to collect statutory damages.”).
266. See Chmielewski et al., supra note 30 (observing that there has been uncertainty on the
interpretation of BIPA, but this ruling establishes clear procedures that a business must adopt in
order to remain compliant).
267. See Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 85 (determining
that Plaintiff alleged an actual injury).
268. Id.
269. Id. ¶ 76 (“Unlike the plaintiff in Rosenbach, plaintiff in our case did allege an ‘injury or
adverse effect’ . . . .”).
270. Id. ¶ 85 (“[D]isclosure to an out-of-state third-party vendor constitutes an injury or adverse
effect, and plaintiff in the instant case alleged such a disclosure, while the Rosenbach plaintiff did
not. Second, the mental anguish that plaintiff alleges in her complaint also constitutes an injury or
adverse effect.” (citation omitted)).
271. See Saikali, supra note 177 (suggesting that only compromise of data in a hacking would
be an injury); see also Illinois Appellate Court Restricts BIPA Claims, MICHAEL BEST (Jan. 4,
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scenarios like the one seen in Sekura, because the Illinois Supreme Court
was clear and unanimous in its decision. This decision does not answer
all questions about BIPA, but it does provide much-needed clarity.272
B. Business Considerations
The Illinois Supreme Court did consider the effect that its holding on
standing under BIPA would have on businesses that must comply with
the Act.273 Critics of Rosenbach argue that by doing away with an actual
injury requirement, BIPA lawsuits will significantly harm businesses and
technological innovation in Illinois.274 This fear is reasonable; the
combination of a lower showing of harm, private right of action, award
of damages per violation, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs poses
serious liability to any business that operates in Illinois or simply has
customers in the state.275 Business advocates suggest that companies will
be forced to do a costly risk assessment to determine if they can accept
the potential liability of implementing new and innovative technologies
that use customers’ biometric data in Illinois.276
It is true that Rosenbach makes Illinois unique in its level of protection
of consumers’ biometric data; however, there is no indication that this
decision’s interpretation of what it means for a party to be aggrieved will
compromise businesses’ ability to compete with other states.277 Of
2018),
https://www.michaelbest.com/Newsroom/159002/Illinois-Appellate-Court-RestrictsBIPA-Claims (speculating that answer of emotional harm is not settled).
272. See Grande, supra note 260 (“[G]iven the wealth of outstanding legal issues that remain to
be litigated under the statute, the question of which side will have the upper hand in these disputes
in the future is far from settled.”); see also Chmielewski et al., supra note 30 (“Questions remain
as to the applicability of BIPA in many fields, and how entities may operate so as to ensure
compliance with same in such instances of uncertainty.”).
273. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 37.
274. See Saikali, supra note 177 (commenting on high litigation costs); note 94, supra.
275. See Roberts, supra note 259 (observing that companies could lose billions in a major class
action suit); see also Grande, supra note 260 (“The Supreme Court’s answer to the certified
question of what the statute means by ‘aggrieved’ is poised to not only restart the scores of litigation
that has been put on hold in anticipation of the Rosenbach decision, but also clear the way for more
plaintiffs seeking to recoup uncapped statutory damages of between $1,000 and $5,000 per
violation to at least make it through the courthouse doors.”).
276. See Grande, supra note 260 (quoting a commentator who felt that the ruling “really opened
a can of worms and declared open season on a lot of legitimate businesses that are trying to be
innovative”); see also Baylson et al., supra note 258 (discussing that businesses will have to do a
cost-benefit analysis to see if it makes economic sense to use new technologies).
277. In fact, the technology industry in Illinois has continued to grow after the enactment of
BIPA. See Ill. Sci. & Tech. Coal., Illinois’ Share of High-Tech Businesses is Among the Nation’s
Top States, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
bluesky/hub/chi-iin-illinois-high-tech-businesses-bsi-hub-story.html (describing growth of the
technology industry in Illinois); Mark Schultz, The Illinois Economy Kicks Off 2018 With Strong
Numbers, ILL. PUB. MEDIA NEWS (Feb. 5, 2018), https://will.illinois.edu/news/story/the-illinoiseconomy-kicks-off-2018-with-strong-numbers (same).
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course, it would not be in Illinois’s best interest to set impossible
standards of compliance for companies and hinder business operations.
However, BIPA does not impose such unworkable standards. Businesses
should not fear a statutory violation because the standards for retention,
collection, disclosure, and destruction of biometric data under BIPA are
fair and achievable.278 In addition to being easy to implement, it is also
less costly for companies to implement smart data protection policies that
monitor compliance with biometric laws in the first instance than to
respond to a massive breach of consumers’ protected biometric data.279
It is in the best interest of both businesses and consumers to implement a
robust biometric protection policy that prevents data compromises and
the ensuing liability.280
Companies that use biometric data can continue their practices; they
simply must ensure their policies conform to BIPA’s modest consent and
disclosure requirements.281 Illinois businesses and out-of-state
businesses with Illinois users or customers should implement policies
regarding the handling of sensitive biometric data so that they are
compliant with BIPA.282 In general, companies should implement robust
278. See Kay, supra note 13, at 3 (“[T]he general requirements for compliance are relatively
straightforward: biometric identifiers and information cannot be sold and cannot be kept longer
than the shorter of three years or until the original purpose for which they were collected is satisfied,
and companies should implement and adhere to robust written policies and procedures for
collecting and safeguarding biometric identifiers and information, and obtain written consent from
the persons from whom they were obtained in order to use them.”).
279. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 37 (“Compliance should not be
difficult; whatever expenses a business might incur to meet the law’s requirements are likely to be
insignificant compared to the substantial and irreversible harm that could result if biometric
identifiers and information are not properly safeguarded . . . .”); see also note 63, supra.
280. The costs of data breaches are increasing. See IBM Study: Hidden Costs of Data Breaches
Increase Expenses for Businesses, IBM NEWS ROOM (July 11, 2018), https://newsroom.ibm.com/
2018-07-10-IBM-Study-Hidden-Costs-of-Data-Breaches-Increase-Expenses-for-Businesses
(finding that “the average cost of a data breach globally is $3.86 million,” which represents an
increase of 6.4 percent from 2017); see also Niall McCarthy, The Average Cost of a Data Breach
Is Highest in the U.S., FORBES (July 13, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/niallmccarthy/2018/07/13/the-average-cost-of-a-data-breach-is-highest-in-the-u-sinfographic/#4bb575592f37 (finding that the average cost of a data breach in the United States is
$7.9 million, which is the highest in the world).
281. See Michael J. Bologna, Biometric Privacy Ruling Boosts Cases Against Companies,
BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://biglawbusiness.com/biometric-privacy-rulingboosts-cases-against-companies-corrected (quoting a Chicago law firm partner that stated the
ruling would “encourage companies to take reasonable and entirely non-burdensome steps to ensure
biometrics are protected”); see also McCall, supra note 259 (suggesting that employers conduct
privacy audits to make sure that their policies are compliant with this statute).
282. See Zielinksi, supra note 9 (“‘It’s essential to also have a written policy in place.’ . . . ‘The
policy should detail exactly the type of devices being used and what specifically they’re being used
for. That should be clear so employees can’t later claim they didn’t know how and why biometrics
would be used in the workplace.’”); see also A New Threat from an Old Source, supra note 16
(providing programs for employers so that they are compliant with BIPA standards); Kay, supra
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written policies and procedures for collecting and safeguarding biometric
information, should always provide written notice to their users, and get
written consent that provides the intended use of the biometric data.
Additionally, companies should avoid selling any information or keeping
the data for over three years, and develop a plan for destruction of the
material. If businesses develop a compliant plan and adhere to the
straightforward guidelines of BIPA, standing based on a statutory
violation will not be harmful. In any event, as the Rosenbach court noted,
“[W]hatever expenses a business might incur to meet the law’s
requirements are likely to be insignificant compared to the substantial and
irreversible harm that could result if biometric identifiers and information
are not properly safeguarded.”283
C. The Expansion of Privacy Laws
The Rosenbach decision reflects a trend of growing concern regarding
data privacy and is likely a preview of future state and federal legislation
ahead. Although Illinois currently has the most stringent biometric
collection policy, other states may soon join Illinois in offering stronger
protection for biometric information.284 In June 2018, California’s
governor signed the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA).285
This act establishes a broad privacy framework that businesses must

note 13 (same).
283. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 37.
284. See David Cohen, Nicholas Farnsworth & Aravind Swaminathan, Roller Coaster Start to
the New Year for Biometrics: Rosenbach v. Six Flags and Emerging Biometric Laws, JD SUPRA
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/roller-coaster-start-to-the-new-year-90991/
(observing that California, Washington, Massachusetts, and New York are considering
implementation of new privacy statutes); Andrew C. Glass, Gregory N. Blase & Daniel S. Cohen,
Massachusetts State Senators Seek to Enact Biometric Data Protection Law, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb.
11, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/massachusetts-state-senators-seek-to-enactbiometric-data-protection-law (“In Massachusetts, for instance, four state senators introduced a bill
(S.D 341) in late January that would require companies to refrain from collecting personal and
biometric data absent express consent from the affected consumer.”); Odia Kagan, Multiple States
Considering New Data Privacy Legislation, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Feb. 10, 2019),
https://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/2019/02/articles/california-consumer-privacy-act/multiplestates-considering-new-data-privacy-legislation/ (stating that data privacy bills are pending in at
least eight states); Andreas Kaltsounis & Shea Leitch, Washington State Proposes Sweeping
Privacy Legislation, JD SUPRA (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/washingtonstate-proposes-sweeping-95926/ (describing a new Washington privacy law that was proposed in
January 2019).
285. Shoshana S. Speiser, Recent Developments in California Privacy Law, MANATT (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.manatt.com/Insights/Newsletters/Advertising-Law/Recent-Developments-inCalifornia-Privacy-Law (note that amendment passed later); see Your Readiness Roadmap for the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/consulting/
cybersecurity/california-consumer-privacy-act.html (last visited June 18, 2019) (The CCPA will go
into effect in 2020).
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follow and provides consumers greater control of their data.286 Some
notable provisions of this act include an expanded definition of “personal
information,” creating new rights for California consumers to control
their data, imposing new rules on the collection of personal information
from minors, and creating a private right of action for some statutory
violations.287
Similarly, the state of Washington is considering a proposed law, the
Washington Privacy Act (WPA), which would create a set of consumer
rights similar to those provided in CCPA.288 In Massachusetts, state
senators introduced a bill289 in late January that would require companies
to refrain from collecting personal and biometric data absent express
consent from the affected consumer.290 Like BIPA and CCPA, this Act
would also provide a private right of action.291 Lastly, the state of New
York is considering the enactment of its own biometric privacy act.292
The proposed act would be similar to BIPA, providing individuals a
private right of action if they were aggrieved by any violation of the

286. See Cohen, Farnsworth & Swaminathan, supra note 284 (“The CCPA introduced sweeping
changes to the U.S. privacy landscape by granting California residents enhanced rights in relation
to their personal information (which includes biometric information), as well as a private right of
action for certain breaches of personal information.”).
287. See id. (explaining the details of the CCPA and noting that personal information includes
biometric privacy); see also Harry A. Valetk & Brian Hengesbaugh, A Practical Guide to CCPA
Readiness: Implementing Calif.’s New Privacy Law (Part 1), CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 10, 2018, 10:40
AM),
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/12/10/a-practical-guide-to-ccpa-readinessimplementing-calif-s-new-privacy-law-part-1/?slreturn=20190116174958 (discussing changes
from the CCPA).
288. See Kaltsounis & Leitch, supra note 284 (explaining that the new statute requires that
companies provide consumers with access, deletion, correction, restriction, portability, objection,
and protections from profiling); see also Cohen, Farnsworth & Swaminathan, supra note 284
(noting similarities between the Washington Privacy Act and the CCPA).
289. S. 120, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019).
290. See Glass, Blase & Cohen, supra note 284 (describing that the bill “would require
companies to refrain from collecting personal and biometric data absent express consent from the
affected consumer. . . . [and] consumers could request a copy of their personal data that has been
collected, restrict disclosure of their data to third parties, and even require the business to delete
their data”); see also Cohen, Farnsworth & Swaminathan, supra note 284 (describing the
Massachusetts bill which grants consumers rights in relation to personal information).
291. See Glass, Blase & Cohen, supra note 284 (“The bill also contemplates granting consumers
a private right of action to obtain the greater of actual damages or $750 per incident, injunctive or
declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Notably, the bill would expressly confer standing
to sue regardless of whether the unauthorized biometric data collected caused actual harm”); Cohen,
Farnsworth & Swaminathan, supra note 284.
292. See Stephanie J. Kapinos, New York City Considers Facial Recognition Bill—Will New
York Be the Next Forum for Biometric Privacy Litigation?, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-york-city-considers-facial-recognition-bill-will-newyork-be-next-forum (explaining that New York City Council members introduced a bill (Bill Int.
No. 1170) for the city council that would regulate the use of biometric technology).
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statute.293
These enacted and proposed laws demonstrate a growing recognition
of the importance of biometric privacy protection.294 Illinois was at the
forefront of implementing biometric privacy protections, but action in
state legislatures across the county reflect a growing concern for data
privacy. In addition to protections at the state level, the federal
government appears poised to consider implementing uniform data
protection regulation in the near future.295 Consumers, data privacy
advocates, and technology companies alike have voiced support for a
consistent federal privacy policy.296 Between new state statutes and a
possible federal law, it is likely that the protection of data will be an
important topic for years to come. Illinois, through BIPA, has offered a
strong template for future data protection legislation.
293. See id. (noting that the statute requires businesses to give notice to customers if they are
collecting “biometric identifier information.” The bill “includes a private right of enforcement but
avoids the statutory standing issue litigated in Rosenbach by providing that ‘any person who[se]
biometric identifier information was collected, retained, converted, stored or shared in violation of
[the law] may commence an action.’” (alteration in original)).
294. See Glass, Blase & Cohen, supra note 284 (“The growing use of Big Data and biometric
data has caused some concern among consumers and policymakers. In response, several state
legislatures have taken steps to regulate companies’ ability to acquire personal and biometric
data.”); Kagan, supra note 284.
295. See Grande, supra note 260 (predicting that less stringent federal laws may be advocated
for by the business community); see also Dan Clark, Federal Data Privacy Legislation Is Likely
Next Year, Tech Lawyers Say, CORP. COUNS. (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/2018/11/29/federal-data-privacy-legislation-is-likely-next-year-tech-lawyers-say/
(surmising that 2019 may be a year that a federal statute is proposed as “[m]ore and more people
have become aware of how much of their personal information is on the internet, and they are more
aware of the risks of having that information exposed. Over the past couple of months, legislators,
trade organizations and even tech companies have stepped up their efforts to pass data privacy and
cybersecurity legislation”). See also David Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace
Data Privacy?, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-data-privacylaw/ (discussing the impact that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may have
on US policy). The GDPR provides greater privacy protection for consumers as it mandates consent
and gives consumers more control over their data (for instance, they can delete information after
they provide it). Id. The act imposes large fines on those that violate the regulation. US Companies
who work in the EU have to comply with this statue. Id. This statute provides unity and greater
consumer protection, and some advocates would like the U.S. to follow suit. Id.
296. See Tony Romm, Can Washington Keep Watch over Silicon Valley? The FTC’s Facebook
Probe Is a High-Stakes Test, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/02/20/can-washington-keep-watch-over-silicon-valley-ftcs-facebook-probe-ishigh-stakes-test/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.566ea863c581 (commenting on the desire for a
uniform federal law as some privacy advocates have found that the lack of uniformity in data
protection results in inconsistent enforcement); see also Danielle Abril, This Is What Tech
Companies Want in Any Federal Data Privacy Legislation, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2019),
http://fortune.com/2019/02/21/technology-companies-federal-data-privacy-law/ (“Several big
technology companies have a message for any U.S. lawmakers crafting new data privacy rules:
Follow our advice.” Technology companies are lobbying for a uniform law because complying
with “hodgepodge” state laws is burdensome and these companies hope to provide guidance on
provisions in this possible statute.).
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Until more states and possibly the federal government take their own
action to protect sensitive consumer data, BIPA, as interpreted by
Rosenbach, will likely have significant extraterritorial reach. Illinois is
the sixth most populous state, and Chicago is home to some of the world’s
largest technology companies and a burgeoning tech startup
community.297
In short, any company, technology or otherwise, that wishes to do
business in Illinois, or with Illinois users, will have to comply with BIPA.
While companies could segregate Illinois customers and users into their
own more robust data privacy protocol, this seems unlikely and cost
inefficient. More likely is that businesses subject to BIPA will adopt
BIPA-compliant data privacy policies for all its customers and users,
regardless of state citizenship.298
D. Protection of Consumers
The Illinois Supreme Court’s Rosenbach decision recognized the
297. See Benjamin Elisha Sawe, The 50 US States Ranked By Population, WORLDATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/us-states-by-population.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2018)
(listing populations of states); see also Conor Cawley, 15 Fastest Growing Tech Companies in
Chicago, TECH.CO (Dec. 13, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://tech.co/news/fastest-growing-techcompanies-chicago-2017-12 (describing fast-growing tech companies and start-ups in Chicago);
Anna Marie Kukec, Tech Companies Are Choosing Chicago, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018, 12:01
AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2018-09-20/why-tech-companies-arechoosing-chicago (detailing tech companies that have expanded into Chicago, including Facebook,
LinkedIn, Uber, Yelp, Google, and Microsoft).
298. For instance, Indeed, Google, and Facebook have already been subject to suit under the
BIPA for their facial recognition software, and in light of Rosenbach, it would appear their potential
liability is significant enough to cause them consider BIPA-compliant policies for all users. See
Susan Fahringer et al., Google Defeats Biometric Privacy Lawsuit on Article III Standing Grounds,
PERKINS COIE (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/google-defeatsbiometric-privacy-lawsuit-on-article-iii-standing-grounds.html (detailing Google’s BIPA suit);
Ally Marotti, Facebook Could Be Forced to Pay Billions of Dollars Over Alleged Violations of
Illinois Biometrics Law, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 17, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-biz-facebook-tagging-privacy-lawsuit-20180417-story.html (describing the biometric
suit that Facebook was involved in); Joel Rosenblatt, Facebook Can’t Avoid Privacy Suit Over
Biometric Face Prints, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:26 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-26/facebook-can-t-avoid-privacy-lawsuitover-biometric-face-prints (providing information on Facebook biometric suit); see also Robert
Fallah, Illinois Supreme Court’s Biometric Privacy Ruling Raises Liability Risk, SHRM: ST. &
LOC. UPDATES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-andcompliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/illinois-supreme-court-biometric-privacy-ruling-raisesliability-risk.aspx (“At present, the issue of standing at the federal level remains unresolved, but
employers would be well advised to adopt procedures similar to those required under BIPA, as
more states are considering or have already introduced similar legislation and others have expanded
expectations for employers to protect employees’ biometric data.”); Ryan S. Higgins et al.,
Biometric Privacy Update – Actual Harm Not Required, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.mwe.com/insights/biometric-privacy-update-actual-harm-notrequired/ (suggesting that organizations closely scrutinize their biometric practices to comply with
BIPA).
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legislature’s intent in the creation of BIPA and prioritized the protection
of consumers.299 The court found that the legislature intended for a
statutory violation to create an “aggrieved party.” 300 The Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision respected the intent of the legislature and offers heighted
privacy security for consumers.
BIPA was created in response to both the growing use of biometrics
and uncertainty surrounding the technology. 301 The Illinois legislature
was concerned with protecting consumer data, and recognized that
regulation was necessary as businesses increasingly utilized, and profited
from, biometrics in Illinois.302 Since BIPA was enacted in 2008, the use
of biometric data has significantly increased and is utilized in a variety of
applications and industries, and its use will only become more
prevalent.303 The widespread use of biometrics has heightened the
importance of regulating the collection and use of biometric data.304 In
enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature recognized the significance of an
individual having notice and control over their data.305 Notice ensures
that individuals know how and why their information is being used, and
allows individuals to make an informed decision on whether to disclose
that information. Without this notice, an individual may have no way of
knowing whether their information is being collected and what it is being
299. The Illinois Supreme Court utilized Illinois rules of interpretation to reach its holding that
a statutory violation constitutes an aggrieved party. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019
IL 123186, ¶¶ 33–35 (discussing standing under BIPA and connecting it with the legislative intent
of the General Assembly).
300. See id. ¶ 34 (“When a private entity fails to adhere to the statutory procedures, as
defendants are alleged to have done here, ‘the right of the individual to maintain [his or] her
biometric privacy vanishes into thin air. The precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to prevent
is then realized.’ This is no mere ‘technicality.’ The injury is real and significant.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Patel v. Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018))).
301. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2018) (noting the purpose of the BIPA); see also Brief of
Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3,
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317 (No. 123186), 2018 WL 5777921
(describing the purpose of the BIPA).
302. See generally, e.g., H.R. Debate Transcript, 95th Gen. Assemb. No. 276, at 249 (Ill. 2008)
(statement of Rep. Kathy Ryg) (debating the costs and benefits of the BIPA); see also 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 14/5 (discussing the legislative findings and intent).
303. See McCray, supra note 2, at 77; What Is Biometrics?, supra note 6; see also Zielinksi,
supra note 9.
304. See Brief of Amici Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of PlaintiffAppellant, supra note 301, at 3 (“The ensuing decade has confirmed the wisdom and necessity of
the legislature’s action, as the collection and use of biometric information has proliferated and the
privacy threats of nonconsensual collection and use of biometric information have become even
clearer.”).
305. See id. at 9 (“Individuals cannot have a meaningful opportunity to decide whether they
wish their biometric identifiers to be collected unless they have an enforceable right to notice of
the ‘specific purpose . . . for which . . . [the data] is being collected, stored, and used,’ and to deny
consent for its ‘disclos[ure or] redisclos[ure].’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15)).
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used for—precisely the harm that the Illinois legislature wanted to
ameliorate.306 Through BIPA’s notice and consent requirement, the
Illinois legislature afforded protections for individuals as soon as their
data is collected rather than after a data compromise occurs.307
The Illinois Supreme Court’s holding honors the intent of the Illinois
legislature and offers strong protection for consumers. Employees,
consumers, and other individuals can be confident that their information
is safe and have a meaningful remedy if it is not. 308 BIPA’s private right
of action, with a minimal standing requirement, holds companies
accountable for the unique biometric data collected, and potential liability
gives a company strong incentive to comply with the commonsense
requirements of BIPA.309 Had the court in Rosenbach required plaintiffs
show actual harm, BIPA’s notice and consent requirements would have
lacked enforcement power and the effectiveness of BIPA’s protection
would be undercut. For these reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court’s
decision will bolster consumer protection.
CONCLUSION
Technological innovation creates positive opportunities for Illinois
companies and consumers alike. Biometrics is an emerging area of
technology, and its uses and applications are only starting to be seen. In
the business setting, the use of biometrics has increased convenience,
security, and the ability to monitor employees. Its increasingly
widespread use is a testament to its utility. However, widespread use of
biometric technology carries significant risks. An individual’s biometric
information is highly personal and sensitive; it cannot be changed like a
credit card number. Because of this, individuals have a strong interest in
ensuring that their unique information is used only in the manner they
intend and that the companies in possession of their data do so in a secure
306. See id. at 11 (“Notice is the ‘most fundamental principle’ of privacy protection.” (quoting
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/
priv-23a.pdf)).
307. See H.R. Debate Transcript, 95th Gen. Assemb. No. 276, at 249 (Ill. 2008) (statement of
Rep. Kathy Ryg) (discussing the BIPA’s benefit to consumers).
308. Standing requires no further harm than a statutory violation.
309. See Grande, supra note 260 (describing the opinions of some commentators that found that
the BIPA holding “is a profound victory for workers and consumers across Illinois who can now
seek monetary damages against corporations that skirt the law and jeopardize the security of
individuals’ biometric data”).
When private entities face liability for failure to comply with the law’s requirements
without requiring affected individuals or customers to show some injury beyond
violation of their statutory rights, those entities have the strongest possible incentive to
conform to the law and prevent problems before they occur and cannot be undone.
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 37.

1100

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

manner. For these reasons, the Illinois legislature passed BIPA as a means
to facilitate the use of biometric data with robust protections for
consumers. The legislature recognized the importance of ensuring that
consumers are aware of how their data was being used and safeguarding
this data to prevent harm to the individual and unauthorized transfers to
third parties.
BIPA’s requirements are well tailored to achieve this goal. The
requirements that businesses receive informed written consent, maintain
proper safeguarding regulations, have retention and destruction
guidelines, and abstain from profiting from biometric data are
straightforward and achieve the legislature’s goals. BIPA’s private right
of action provision holds companies accountable for their compliance
with the Act and ensures that consumers’ interests are respected. The
court in McCollough and the lower Rosenbach court limited the
protection of individuals by requiring harm beyond a mere statutory
violation as a requisite for standing. The legislature and statute intended
for a consumer to be informed and protected as a means to guard against
harm. To require an individual to wait until harm has occurred would
frustrate the purpose of the statute.
As such, the Illinois Supreme Court was correct to overturn the lower
court’s decision and find that an individual is “aggrieved” when a
statutory violation occurs. Its decision was logical because it followed
Illinois’s rules on statutory interpretation and honored the legislature’s
intent. Although the court’s holding may increase the number of suits
filed, it will also provide clarity to the legislative landscape. In light of
the holding, businesses need to create clear notice and consent policies
before collecting biometric data. The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision
is not likely to halt biometric progress, but it will augment the protection
of consumers in the evolving landscape of technological developments.

